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Abstract 
 
I analyze a dataset of news from the New York Times, from 1946 to 1997. Controlling 
for the incumbent President's activity across issues, I find that during the presidential 
campaign the New York Times gives more emphasis to topics that are owned by the 
Democratic party (civil rights, health care, labor and social welfare), when the incumbent 
President is a Republican. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the New York 
Times has a Democratic partisanship, with some "watchdog" aspects, in that -during the 
presidential campaign- it gives more emphasis to issues over which the (Republican) 
incumbent is weak. In the post-1960 period the Times displays a more symmetric type of 
watchdog behaviour, just because during presidential campaigns it gives more more 
coverage to the typically Republican issue of Defense when the incumbent President is a 
Democrat, and less so when the incumbent is a Republican. 
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1 Introduction
It is a commonly held view that mass media play a crucial role in the political and
electoral process1. This is the case because mass media, in their quality of news
providers, o¤er readers and viewers pieces of information about the current state of
a¤airs, incumbent politiciansperformance and the behaviour of candidates during
electoral campaigns.
This paper is the rst to present evidence on the editorial choices of the New
York Times, using a large sample of stories published between 1946 and 1997.
According to the theory of agenda-setting e¤ects, mass media outlets can inu-
ence the agenda of the public, by tilting it towards those issues that they decide to
cover more extensively. As vividly described by Cohen [1963], the press [...]may not
be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly
successful in telling its readers what to think about. The world will look di¤erent
to di¤erent people depending on the map that is drawn for them by writers, editors,
and publishers of the paper they read.
Such agenda-setting ability could have relevant electoral e¤ects, to the extent
that citizens on average think that a given party or candidate is more capable of
handling problems related to a given issue, and would vote for that party if such
issue turns out to be the most salient one. This is the issue ownership hypothesis,
as characterised by Petrocik [1996].
However, there is very little evidence on whether and how mass media make
use of their agenda-setting power. In particular, it is natural to ask whether a
newspaper or a TV news broadcast systematically changes its coverage of issues
during electoral campaigns, by tilting it towars topics over which a given political
party is perceived as more capable by the majority of citizens. This would be
consistent with the said newspaper being partisan in favour of that party.
During the electoral campaign a newspaper could behave di¤erently as a func-
tion of the political a¢ liation of the incumbent government. It could in fact act as
a watchdog, by di¤erentially giving less coverage to issues over which the incumbent
governments party is perceived as strong. Or vice versa it could act as a lapdog, by
devoting more space to those issues which are owned2 by the incumbents party. Fi-
nally, it would be relevant to understand whether outside of the electoral campaign
the newspaper gives more coverage to topics owned by the incumbent governments
party, controlling for the governments activity on these issues.
I answer these questions by analysing a large dataset of stories on the New York
Times, and focusing my attention on U.S. presidential campaigns. This random
sample of articles on the Times was collected by Frank Baumgartner, Bryan Jones
and John Wilkerson within the Policy Agendas Project and classied according to
the major topic being addressed. Within the set of coded topics, I classify a given
topic as being owned by the Republican or the Democratic party if a majority of
1See e.g. DellaVigna and Kaplan [2005] for an estimate of the e¤ects of the introduction of
Fox News on the Republican vote at presidential elections.
2In accord with Petrocik [1996], I dene an issue as owned by a given political party if a
majority of citizens believes that this party is better able to handle problems related to it than
its opponent(s).
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citizens believes that such party is better at handling problems related to it than
the opponent.
My main nding is that the New York Times has a Democratic partisanship,
with some watchdog aspects, in that during the presidential campaign it systemat-
ically gives more emphasis to Democratic topics, but only so when the incumbent
President is a Republican. This set of Democratic topics comprises stories about
civil rights, health care, labor and employment, and social welfare.
This e¤ect of more stories about Democratic issues during the presidential cam-
paign is sizeable: when the incumbent President is a Republican, there are 26
percent more stories about Democratic issues during the three months of the cam-
paign than outside of it. The increase is actually larger (around 33 percent) when
one considers the period starting from the 60s. On the contrary, if the incumbent
President is a Democrat, there is no discernible change in the count of Democratic
stories when the presidential campaign starts. This is true both for the entire sam-
ple and for the post-1960 subperiod, and is consistent with the fact that the partisan
e¤ect and the watchdog e¤ect almost cancel each other.
The typical claim in the issue ownership literature is that the Republican party
owns the issues of crime and defense. In fact, an analysis of Gallup polls and the
National Election Study (NES) shows that this is indeed the case for defense, as in
only three campaign years over a total of twelve there is a reversal in the ownership
of the issue. On the other hand, in three cases out of seven (a shorter time series of
polls is available here) was the Democratic party perceived as more competent than
the GOP on the crime issue. Therefore I separately analyze the coverage of the
two topics on the Times. If one considers the entire time span (from 1946 to 1997),
one cannot nd any systematic variation in the count of stories about these two
topics during the presidential campaign. This asymmetric behaviour on Democratic
and Republican topics during presidential campaigns is indeed consistent with a
Democratic partisanship of the New York Times.
However, when restricting the attention to the 1961-1997 subsample, it turns out
that the New York Times systematically gives more room to stories about Defense
during the presidential campaign, when the incumbent president is a Democrat and
there is no reversal in the ownership of the issue. Just because the ownership reversal
occurs in 1964, 1980 and 1996, this e¤ect would account for the 1968 campaign.
When there is ownership reversal the Times ceteris paribus dedicates less room to
Defense stories during the presidential campaign. Moreover, under the incumbency
of a Republican President there is actually a decrease in the count of stories about
Defense as the presidential campaign starts. Taken together, these ndings are
consistent with a watchdog attitude of the Times, in that during the presidential
campaign there is less coverage of the defense issue when the incumbent President
is perceived as more competent on it than the opponent. Regarding the Law &
Crime issue, there is no comparable pattern of change in the coverage, both for the
entire time period and the post-1960 subsample.
Given the more symmetric behaviour with respect to Democratic topics and the
Defense issue, the evidence regarding the 1961-1997 period lends more support to
the hypothesis that the Times is a watchdog newspaper, and somewhat detracts
from the Democratic partisanship hypothesis.
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In the interpretation of the econometric results, it is necessary to check whether
any time variation in the choice of stories by the New York Times is in fact mirroring
some contemporaneous variation in the activity of other political actors, and in
particular of the incumbent President. As a proxy for the intensity of presidential
activity on a given subset of issues at a given time, I use the relative frequency
of Executive Orders concerning these issues, which are enacted by the incumbent
President during the time period.
Controlling for this proxy of presidential activity across issues, it turns out that
-outside of the presidential campaign- still the Times systematically gives more cov-
erage to Democratic issues when the incumbent President is a Democrat, and to
Defense stories when he is a Republican. This nding about Democratic stories
helps understand the previous results: when the incumbent President is a Demo-
crat, the aggregate count of stories about Democratic topics is already high outside
the presidential campaign, and the presidential campaign does not produce any
additional e¤ect.
Such pattern of correlations does hold for both the entire sample and post-1960
period, where the magnitude and signicance of the e¤ect is stronger for Defense
stories. On the other hand, there is no statistically signicant correlation between
the political a¢ liation of the President and the coverage of the Law & Crime issue.
There are two key identifying assumptions which substantiate my empirical
analysis. The rst assumption is that the issue ownership hypothesis is correct.
In other terms, the induced salience of an issue would give an electoral advantage
to a given candidate, to the extent that there is a majority of voters who believe
this candidate to be better at handling it, than his opponent.
The second assumption can be summarised by the statement: all publicity is
good publicity. The idea is that any story regarding an issue owned by a given
candidate or party, no matter how negative, would not induce readers to change
their perception about the ownership of the issue itself.
This analysis of the issue coverage by the New York Times contributes to the
growing empirical literature on mass media bias, which I review in section 2.2. My
approach is novel in three distinct ways:
1. I am interested in the agenda-setting behaviour of the newspaper, i.e. in its
coverage of various policy issues. The agenda-setting framework, coupled with
the issue ownership hypothesis, provides an intuitive way to think about the
political stance of the newspaper.
2. My focus is on the time variation of the issue coverage by the Times, and in
particular on how such coverage changes during presidential campaigns.
3. Given the time series framework and the sample length, I am able to investi-
gate the di¤erential behaviour of the Times during the presidential campaign
as a function of the political a¢ liation of the incumbent President. I use the
denitions of lapdog and watchdog to classify such di¤erential behaviour.
As a collateral result, my paper contributes to the literature itself on issue own-
ership, by presenting survey data from Gallup and the National Election Study
3
which cover a much longer time period than the one explicitly analyzed by Petro-
cik. The data gathered here broadly conrm, with some qualications, the issue
ownership pattern suggested by Petrocik.
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2 I discuss some related litera-
ture; section 3 describes the dataset. In section 4 I present the empirical strategy.
Section 5 discusses the results, with some robustness checks and renements. Sec-
tion 6 confronts the ndings with the theoretical literature on mass media bias and
concludes.
2 Related literature
2.1 Evidence on the agenda setting hypothesis
The theory of agenda setting e¤ects is built around the idea that mass media can
inuence the importance readers and viewers attach to di¤erent issues3. As Lipp-
mann [1922] notes, pieces of news provided by mass media outlets are a primary
source of information, and sometimes the only one, about public a¤airs: in the lack
of information provided by mass media, most events related to public a¤airs would
indeed be out of reach, out of sight, out of mindfor the large majority of citizens.
Hence editors and journalists can have relevant degrees of freedom in the choice
of what is newsworthy, and this way they are able to inuence the perception of
citizens about which issues are relevant and to what extent.
McCombs and Shaw [1972] is the seminal empirical contribution in which the
theory of agenda-setting e¤ects has been put to test: during the 1968 US presidential
election, a sample of voters in Chapel Hill, Carolina, was asked to mention what
were the key issues of the campaign. These reported rankings were matched with
the pattern of news coverage by newspapers and network television news in the
previous month: the found correlation between these measures of the media and
the public agenda was always positive and typically very large.
In fact, after McCombs and Shaw [1972], there has been a host of empirical
studies striving to test for the presence of agenda-setting e¤ects, either replicating
their simple correlation exercise, or adopting more sophisticated empirical designs,
ranging from cross sectional and longitudinal to experimental ones.
Experimental evidence, as the one provided by Iyengar et al. [1982], lends the
strongest support to the agenda setting hypothesis. Both the treatment and the
control group agreed to view what were alleged to be recordings of the previous
evenings TV news programme: those in the control group watched the original
programme, while individuals in the treatment viewed an altered version of it, with
increased coverage of a given national issue. Before and after the experiment, indi-
viduals in both groups were administered a questionnaire about the most important
problem. Controlling for the ex ante personal agenda, individuals in the treatment
group systematically attached a higher ex post importance to the issue whose media
coverage had been magnied.
3For more detailed surveys about the literature on agenda-setting e¤ects, see Erbring, Golden-
berg and Miller [1980], Iyengar, Kinder and Peters [1982], Iyengar and Simon [2000] and McCombs
[2002].
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The choice itself of the topics being covered by the news media could produce
electoral e¤ects, to the extent that voters on average reckon candidates belonging
to a given party as more capable of handling a given issue. This is the concept of
issue ownership, as introduced by Petrocik [1996]. Analyzing news content, answers
to open-ended questions about issue salience, and the vote itself for presidential
elections between 1960 and 1992, Petrocik shows that candidates tend to emphasize
owned issues in their political speeches. Secondly, given that issues owned by the
Democratic (Republican) party are salient, turnout of Republicans (Democrats)
tends to decrease, while the opposite holds for Democrats (Republicans). Moreover,
Independents vote more for the Democratic (Republican) candidate.
Apart from these survey-based results, Ansolabehere and Iyengar [1994] present
some experimental evidence about issue ownership e¤ects. According to their study
of the 1992 senatorial and presidential campaign in California, viewers of televised
political ads were more likely to express a voting preference for the candidate that
dealt with the owned issue rather than the same candidate dealing with the non-
owned one, in this case the Republican discussing crime instead of unemployment,
and vice versa for a Democrat.
2.2 Evidence on the political behaviour of mass media
Compared with the dense literature on agenda setting, there are very few empirical
studies about the actual political behaviour of mass media outlets, which go beyond
anedoctal evidence4. All these studies are quite recent, and share the common
approach of disregarding the link between media content and public opinion, which
is the primary focus of the literature on agenda setting e¤ects, in order to focus the
analysis on the behaviour itself of mass media outlets as political actors.
Groseclose and Milyo [2005] use a subtle cross-sectional design in order to esti-
mate the relative position of mass media outlets in the political spectrum. The idea
is to trace out which think tanks are quoted by various mass media outlets within
news stories; in turn, the position of each think tank in the political spectrum is
calculated as the weighted sum of the adjusted ADA scores of those representatives
in the House and in the Senate that quote it in a non negative way. Using this pro-
cedure, the authors obtain the stark result that all sampled news providers -except
Fox NewsSpecial Report and the Washington Times- are located to the left of
the average Congress member, i.e. there are signs of a liberal bias in the US news
media. However, the news media also show a remarkable degree of centrism, in the
sense that [...]all outlets but one have ADA scores between the average Democrat
and average Republican in Congress.And it turns out that the only media outlet
that is located to the left of the average Democrat -in terms of think tank quotes
within news stories- is the Wall Street Journal.
Regarding the NewYork Times, Groseclose andMilyo estimate an adjusted ADA
score of 73.7 (maximum likelihood estimation). (Adjusted) ADA scores attribute
a larger score to more liberal congressmen, on a 0-100 scale. Just to have a rough
4For a conservative author looking for (and nding) a systematic liberal bias in the mass
media, see Goldberg [2002]. In a specular fashion, see Franken [2003] for a liberal approach
correspondingly nding some conservative bias in the media.
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idea of the relative position of the New York Times, the score for Joe Lieberman
(D, Ct.) is 74.2, while the score for Constance Morella (R, Md.) is 68.2.
Ansolabehere, Lessem and Snyder [2004] analyze the political orientation of en-
dorsements by U.S. newspapers, using a panel data design. There is an upward trend
in the average propensity to endorse a candidate, and in particular an incumbent
one. There are also some changes in the average ideological slant of endorsements:
while in the 40s and in the 50s there was a clear advantage to Republican can-
didates, this advantage continuously eroded in subsequent decades, to the extent
that in the 90s the authors nd a slight Democratslead in the average endorse-
ment choice. In particular, an unquestionable Democratic slant in the endorsement
choices of the New York Times in the TriState area (Connecticut, New Jersey and
New York) emerged in the rst half of the 70s, while during the 40s, 50s and 60s
there was a slight advantage to Republican candidates. It is however true that in
New York State the Times endorsed more Democratic than Republican candidates
already as of the second half of the 50s.
Lott and Hassett [2004] study the coverage of economic news by a panel of
389 U.S. newspapers from 1991 to the rst half of 2004, and from 1985 to 2004
for a subsample comprising the top 10 newspapers and the Associated Press. For
each release of o¢ cial data about a set of economic indicators, the authors analyze
how newspapers decide to report on them, as reected by the tone of the related
headlines. The idea is to check whether newspapers display some kind of partisan
bias, by giving more positive or negative coverage to the same economic datum, as
a function of the political a¢ liation of the incumbent President. Controlling for the
economic data being released, the authors nd that there are between 9.6 and 14.7
percent fewer positive stories when the incumbent President is a Republican.
Regarding the New York Times, for the 1985-2004 period the authors nd a
similar pattern of fewer positive stories under a Republican incumbent, but such
e¤ect is mildly signicant (at the 10% condence level) only in one specication.
The empirical approach adopted by Lott and Hassett is close to the one I follow
here, because of this common focus on the time series behaviour of news providers.
However, their analysis is chiey based on the correlation between the political
a¢ liation of the incumbent President and the average tone adopted by newspapers
in the coverage of economic news, with a minor role played by presidential elections
and campaigns.
2.3 Theories on mass media bias
Within the eld of political economy, there is a growing theoretical literature on
mass media bias, and in general on the political behaviour of mass media. The
common scope of this literature is to understand the reasons why in equilibrium
prot-maximizing media outlets would -through their editorial choices- favor a given
party or candidate.
Mullainathan and Shleifer [2005] suggest a demand-driven interpretation of this.
The crucial behavioural assumption is that readers and viewers hold beliefs that
they would like to see conrmed by news providers. When news customers share
common beliefs, prot-maximizing media outlets nd it optimal to select and/or
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frame stories in order to pander to those beliefs. On the other hand, when beliefs
are heterogenous, news providers di¤erentiate their o¤er and segment the market,
by providing news stories that are slanted towards the two extreme positions in the
spectrum of beliefs.
Gentzkow and Shapiro [2006] present another demand-driven theory of mass me-
dia bias, which however does not rely on behavioural assumptions. If readers and
viewers are Bayesian updaters, have a priori views on the state of the world and are
uncertain about the quality of the information about it being provided by media
outlets, then the latter have an incentive to slant stories towards their customers
prior, in order to build and keep a reputation for high-quality journalism. The rea-
son for this is that Bayesian agents would tend to believe that pieces of information
that go against their prior in fact originate from low-quality news providers.
Baron [2006] proposes a supply-driven explanation for a persistent media bias,
i.e. for a generalised slant of media outlets in favor of a given political position.
This is the case if journalists, which are an essential input for news production,
are characterised by a common ideological stance, i.e. they are all on average
conservatives or liberal. It follows that media outlets maximise prots by slanting
news stories towards the political bias of journalists, in order to benet from a lower
wage being demanded by the latter in equilibrium.
The three models discussed above share the common assumption of prot max-
imization by news providers. In a di¤erent context, Besley and Prat [2005] build a
model in which mass media capture by the incumbent government (that translates
into suppression of unfavorable news) takes place because media outlets trade o¤
prots from sales and advertising against a direct or indirect bribe from the gov-
ernment itself. In this model the prot-maximization assumption is kept, but two
di¤erent sources of income are traded o¤ by media outlets.
In fact, the main alternative explanation for media bias is that the owners them-
selves have political preferences that are traded o¤ against the pure prot maxi-
mization motive. Depending on the relative strength of these two motivations, a
more or less intense slant of the news towards the owners political preferences would
emerge in equilibrium5.
3 Data description
3.1 Evidence on issue ownership
The seminal contribution in the issue ownership literature is Petrocik [1996]. In
fact, all subsequent contributions that are based on an issue ownership hypothesis
grossly take as given Petrociks partition of issues into Democratic, Republican and
performance ones6. However, Petrocik [1996] substantiates such a classication with
survey data covering a short time period, which spans from 1988 to 1991 only. It
is therefore empirically unclear whether the ownership status of policy issues, as
stated by Petrocik, is indeed a long-term phenomenon.
5See Sutter [2001] for a discussion along these lines.
6See Ansolabehere and Iyengar [1994], Feeley [2001], Benoit, Hansen and Petrocik [2003].
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My contribution to this literature is to collect survey data on issue ownership
which cover a longer time period than Petrociks. Using Gallup surveys, and the
National Election Study when Gallup data is not available, I am able to gather issue
ownership percentages7 that date back to 1972 for the issues of social welfare and
crime, to 1956 for civil rights, and to 1948 for defense. These data are presented in
Table 1.
I use Gallup polls as the primary source of information, because of the more
direct way its questions about issue ownership are worded, when compared with
the NES. The typical Gallup format is to ask respondents about which party or
candidate they think is better at handling a given issue; thus, the question itself
species the issue about which respondents must express their opinion.
By contrast, one can obtain information about issue ownership from the NES
only in a indirect fashion. Since 1960 the NES has administered a question about
what the most important problem facing the country. Starting from 1972, this
question about the most important problem (henceforth, MIP) has been coupled
with one about [...]which political party [...]would be most likely to get the gov-
ernment to do a better job in dealing with this problem [...]8. Such survey design
could su¤er from a selection bias (unobservable factors determining the answer to
the MIP question could be correlated with factors a¤ecting the answer to the own-
ership one), and from a low degree of statistical reliability, given the possibly small
number of respondents naming a given issue as the most salient one.
Regarding Gallup polls, I have searched for all questions about the ownership
status of a given issue during presidential election years, from 1948 to 1996. In
particular, I am interested in questions concerning those issues which, following
Petrocik [1996], one would ex ante code as permanently owned by the Republican
or the Democrats, namely defense and crime on the Republican side, and civil
rights, welfare and health care on the Democratic side. When, for a given year, the
ownership question about an issue was asked more than once (e.g. more than one
question about civil rights being administered during the same presidential year, or
about di¤erent facets of the same issue), I average the issue ownership percentage,
in order to obtain a synthetic measure9.
Regarding the civil rights and the welfare issues, Table 1 broadly conrms Petro-
ciks claim about a permanent Democratic ownership thereof, albeit with some
qualications.
As discussed by Carmines and Stimson [1990], a more precise stance of the De-
mocratic party on the race issue emerged during the late 50s, and consolidated
during the early 60s; this was mainly due to the increasingly weak bargaining po-
sition of the Southern Democrats within their party. The rst column of Table 1
shows that in 1956 and 1960 there was a tiny Democratic advantage on the owner-
7By issue ownership percentages I am referring to the percentage of respondents believing that
a Democrat is better able of handling a given issue, minus the percentage trusting a Republican
more.
8In the NES, the questions about the most important problem and the ownership status of
that problem are respectively coded as VCF0875 and VCF9012.
9As Table A.1 and A.2 show, the yearly frequency with which Gallup asked questions about
the ownership status of isuues is denitely increasing across time, exponentially so during the late
80s and the 90s.
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ship of civil rights, which exploded in 1964, with a lead of almost 35 percent. Since
then, the Democrats have maintained an advantage of at least 10 percent on the
issue.
Data concerning the welfare issue, i.e. about which party would be better at
helping the poor and the needy, cover a shorter time span, starting from 1972.
Here there is a sizeable and permanent perceived advantage for the Democrats,
which shows much less time variation than for the race issue, during the same
period. Unluckily, pieces of information about the issue of health care are available
only for 1992 and 1996 (Gallup), with a Democrats advantage being above 20
percent.
On the other hand, the pieces of information I have gathered provide a more
complex picture of the Republicanissues of domestic and international security.
Regarding the crime issue, I obtain ownership percentages for seven presidential
elections, from 1972 to 1996: in 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988 there is a Republican
advantage, which reaches its peak in 1984, with a lead of almost 39 percent. In
1976, 1992 and 1996 there is in fact a reversal, with a clear Democratic advantage.
Just because during three presidential years over a sample of seven there is a De-
mocratic lead, it is not entirely clear whether one can safely code the crime issue
as a Republican one10.
Finally, the issue of defense and foreign policy, which is covered by the longest
stream of Gallup surveys, clearly shows a pattern of Republican ownership. In fact,
in nine out of twelve cases there is a GOP lead, with a minimum of less than one
percent in 1948 and a peak of more than 44 percent in 1992. The three exceptions
occur in 1964, 1980 and 1996. In 1964 Gallup posed two survey questions about
the handling of the Vietnam war11, and respondents largely attributed a primacy
to Johnsons party, with a di¤erence of almost 42 percent. In 1980 ten questions
about foreign policy and defense were asked, with two concerning the Iran situation.
A problem with these polls is that the most recent ones were administered in the
early days of September, so that the nal part of the hostage crisis in Iran did not
receive any coverage by Gallup. In 1996 there was a clear advantage of Bill Clinton
over Bob Dole on the issue. One should however notice how in that year Clinton
enjoyed an ownership advantage over Dole on almost all issues.
3.2 The New York Times dataset
Data about the coverage of issues by the New York Times is taken from the Policy
Agendas Project12.
Together with data about Congressional Hearings, Public Laws and Executive
10One should also bear in mind that the crime issue is the one for which I most frequently use
the NES as an ancillary source of information.
11See Table A.1 for the specic questions being asked.
12See the Projects website at http://www.policyagendas.org. The data used here were
originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National
Science Foundation grant number SBR 9320922, and were distributed through the Center for
American Politics and Public Policy at the University of Washington and/or the Department of
Political Science at Penn State University. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data
bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.
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Orders, the Project features a random sample of stories from the New York Times
Index, from 1946 to 1997, for a total of 38,470 stories. Each story is classied
according to the major topic being addressed, among a set of 27 topics. Apart from
this, the dataset provides additional pieces of information about the position of the
story on the newspaper (on the front page or in internal pages), and its geographical
and institutional relevance.
In particular, stories are classied according to whether they deal with local
events, i.e. those occurring in New York City or in the so called TriState area
(Connecticut, New Jersey and New York), or not. Moreover, each piece of news
is coded according to whether it features domestic events, foreign events with US
involvement, or foreign events without US involvement. Finally, stories are classied
according to whether they mention actions by some tier of the U.S. government.
While in the original dataset the unit of observation is the single story, I con-
struct monthly counts of stories about the di¤erent topics. I also interacted the
major topic of the story with its various geographical, institutional and positional
features I have mentioned above, in order to obtain more specic time series for
each given topic.
In Table 2, I present some descriptive gures about the relative frequencies of
issues covered by the New York Times in its articles. For reference, I report the
name and the identication number of the topic, as coded in the original dataset by
Baumgartner and Jones. Topics are ordered according to the relative frequency of
stories (column [1]). Column [2] displays the relative frequency of stories regarding
NYC and dealing with the di¤erent issues. Column [3] does the same for TriState
stories, while column [4] refers to stories that do not have a link with either the
TriState or NYC.
The most frequent topic for a story in the New York Times is Banking, Finance
and Domestic Commerce, with 15 percent of stories. International A¤airs rank
second, with more than 13 percent of stories, which in fact conrms the common
perception of the Times as a newspaper with a clear focus on international events.
The third topic is Federal Government Operations (8 percent of stories), closely
followed by Defense, with more than 7 percent of stories. Some topics are very
relevant at the local level, while they are much less so at the federal one: this is the
case for stories about State and Local Administration (almost by denition), about
Law & Crime and about Housing.
The last two rows of Table 2 report the relative frequency of stories about those
aggregates of topics which, in accord with the issue ownership dataset, I classify
as Democratic and Republican ones13. The set of Democratic issues comprises
Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare; the set of
Republican ones comprises Defense and Law & Crime. As discussed above, the
ownership of the Crime issue by the GOP is not without dispute.
More than 8 percent of all stories are about Democratic topics, while the cor-
responding gure for Republican ones rises to more than 13 percent. The relative
advantage of Republican issues over Democratic ones on the pages of the New York
Times is around 6 percent for New York City stories, and around 5 percent for
federal ones; it is less than one percent for TriState stories.
13See section 4.4 below.
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The primacy of Banking & Finance as the most frequently covered topic on the
Times could be due to the fact that there is a large number of short stories about
the stock market, which are picked up by the random sampling. In fact, when one
looks at the front page, a di¤erent pattern emerges, as shown by Table 3. The
most covered topic on the front page is International A¤airs (18 percent of stories).
Federal Government Operations and Defense follow, with slightly more than 15
percent of stories each. It turns out that Banking and Finance stories constitute
only 3.8 percent of the total stories on the front page, compared with almost 16
percent on internal pages.
Coming back to the comparison between Democratic and Republican issues, the
last two rows of Table 3 indeed show that the relative advantage of stories about
Republican topics over Democratic ones, being less than 5 percent on internal pages,
jumps to more than 11 percent on the front page.
3.3 The Executive Orders dataset
The Policy Agendas Project features all Executive Orders enacted by Presidents of
the United States, from 1945 to 2001. As mentioned in the introduction, I use this
dataset in order to proxy for the activity of incumbent Presidents across issues.
Executive Orders are classied according to their major topic, within a set of
19 issues. There are in fact eight topics less in the Executive Orders dataset than
in the New York Times one.
In Table 4 I report some summary statistics about the relative frequency of Ex-
ecutive Orders dealing with the various issues. Topics have been ordered according
to their frequency (column [1]), in a descending fashion. The most frequent topic is
Federal Government Operations, with more than 23 percent of all Executive Orders:
it comprises acts of organisation of the Executive, presidential appointments, and
the like. Defense is the second topic by relative frequency, with around 21 percent
of all orders, while International A¤airs is the third one, with 11 percent.
As in the previous tables about the Times, the last two rows of Table 4 display
the relative frequency of Executive Orders concerning Democratic and Republican
issues.
In columns [2] and [3] I report the relative frequency of Executive Orders dealing
with the various issues, conditionally on the political a¢ liation of the incumbent
President. Some sizeable di¤erences are apparent: for example, there are almost
26 percent Executive Orders about Federal Government Operations under a Re-
publican incumbent, while the corresponding gure is 21.5 percent for Democratic
incumbents. Under a Democratic incumbent almost 12 percent of orders concern
Labor & Employment and around 5 percent concern Civil Rights; the corresponding
numbers for Republican incumbents amount to 7 and 3 percent respectively. On the
other hand, around 3 percent of Executive Orders are about Macroeconomics and
Banking & Finance, while the corresponding gures under a Democratic incumbent
do not reach 2 percent.
Given the conditional behaviour of Executive Orders about Civil Rights and
Labor & Employment, which is matched by a similar behaviour of Health Care Or-
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ders14, there are more than 18 percent Executive Orders about Democratic Topics
when the incumbent President is a Democrat, as compared to 12 percent under a
Republican one. On the other hand, the share of Executive Orders about Republi-
can topics is quantitatively similar for both Republican and Democratic presidents
(22 and 23 percent respectively)
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Identifying assumptions
In order to analyze the political behaviour of the New York Times, I focus on the
time series variation in the choice of issues being addressed in its articles.
In a presidential system like the U.S. one, almost by denition presidential
elections play the most crucial role. Thus, the presidential campaign is the period
during which the agenda setting power of a newspaper is most valuable, just because
it is likely that voters make up their mind about whether and whom to vote as
President immediately before the elections, i.e. during the campaign period.
The empirical analysis performed here and the interpretation of its ndings are
based on the following set of identifying assumptions:
(1) The issue ownership hypothesis holds.
(2) All publicity is good publicity.
(3) The relative share of Executive Orders about a subset of issues proxies the
relative intensity of the activity of the incumbent President with respect to
those issues.
First of all, the choice per se of the issues a newspaper covers during the presi-
dential campaign has an electoral e¤ect, to the extent that the rst two assumptions
hold. In other terms, it must be true that the majority of voters reckons candi-
dates belonging to a given political party as better capable of handling problems
related to a given issue, than candidates belonging to the rival party. Moreover, an
increased amount of stories about this issue has the predicted e¤ect of favoring the
political party owning it, if the stories being published are never too negative about
the relative performance on the issue itself of the political party in question.
Given some change in the issue balance of stories the New York Times publishes
during the presidential campaign, such change can be attributed to the strategic
choice of the newspaper itself if no other political actor is changing its behaviour of
news creation along the same time pattern. The prime suspect from such perspective
is of course the incumbent President.
Assumption (3) tackles this point, by stating that the relative frequency of Ex-
ecutive Orders concerning a given set of issues enacted by the incumbent President
at time t should proxy for the share of time and e¤ort his administration devotes
to those issues.
14Executive Orders about Social Welfare in fact follow an opposite pattern, but this e¤ect is
not strong enough to cancel out -within the aggregate of Democratic topics- the pattern found for
the other three topics.
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4.2 Some denitions
As it is implicit in the preceding discussion, there are two main control variables
which are relevant for analyzing the political behaviour of a newspaper along the
time series dimension.
The rst of these variables is the political a¢ liation of the incumbent President.
Within an issue ownership framework, it is natural to ask whether the newspaper
-during non-campaign periods- systematically gives more coverage to issues over
which the incumbent President is perceived as strong or weak.
It could be the case that the newspaper is giving more coverage to issues owned
by the incumbent President just because it is merely reporting on his level of ac-
tivity across issues. In order to try and disentangle the presence of a bias by the
newspaper, one should therefore control for the intensity of the activity of the in-
cumbent administration towards the various issues. In my empirical specication I
use the relative frequency of Executive Orders as a proxy for this relative intensity.
To the extent that the proxy captures the underlying omitted variable, a more
intense coverage of issues owned by the incumbent President could be due to various
reasons that do not exclude each other.
First, this bias could be due to the fact that the newspaper is acting as a
pressure group with respect to these issues, and is taking into account the fact that
the incumbent could be more responsive to pressures that regard owned issues.
Alternatively, this bias could be explained witin a political agency framework.
If the issue ownership hypothesis holds, citizens would tend to elect a President
who is strong on issues that they reckon as salient. Ex post, they want to assess
the performance of the elected president on these issues, and therefore demand
pieces of information about what the president is delivering during the term. The
newspaper responds to this demand for specic information by publishing more
stories concerning the issues owned by the incumbent President.
A third explanation has some behavioural avor. If citizens expect the incum-
bent President to be more active on owned issues, then they are a priori more
interested in stories about these issues. The newspaper accomodates this expec-
tation by publishing more stories about issues owned by the incumbent, as any
deviation that goes against the readersex ante bias could create a cognitive disso-
nance e¤ect, which in turn may lower the newspapers readership and advertising
revenue15.
Conversely, it could be the case that the newspaper -outside of the electoral
campaign- features more stories about the topics over which the incumbent Presi-
dent is weak, still controlling for presidential activity across issues. Such bias could
be due to the fact that the newspaper acts as a permanent watchdog with respect
to the incumbent President, and concentrates its attention on the issues over which
she is perceived as weak by public opinion.
The main focus of this paper is on the electoral behaviour of the NewYork Times.
Indeed, the second control variable which is relevant within a time series framework
is the campaign status, i.e. the fact of being under the presidential campaign. A
15See Mullainathan and Shleifer [2005] for a model of mass media markets, where readers and
viewers hold beliefs that they would like to see conrmed.
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crucial aspect of the U.S. electoral system is that the date of presidential elections is
exogenously xed: the law commands that they must be held on the rst Tuesday
following the rst Monday of November, every four years. While the end point of
the presidential campaign is exogenously xed by Election Day, the starting point
is not exogenous, as it depends on the choices made by the agents involved, i.e. the
candidates and the candidatesparties, the mass media and the public. Nonetheless,
a typical dictum is that the presidential campaign starts on Labor Day, namely the
rst Monday in September. Alternatively, one could think about the Convention of
the challengers party as an earlier starting point for the campaign.
My empirical strategy is focused on the comparison between the coverage of
electorally relevant topics inside and outside of the presidential campaign.
The mechanism at play here is that the newspaper, by increasing during the
presidential campaign period the frequency of articles about issues owned by a given
candidate, would induce its readers, at the margin, to go to the ballot and vote for
the candidate in question. Given the three identifying assumptions stated above,
such increased coverage of owned issues during the presidential campaign would be
a symptom of the fact that the newspaper is partisan towards the candidate owning
these issues. Moreover, one should check that such increase in the coverage of owned
issues does not take place with respect to both Democratic and Republican ones.
It is in fact the asymmetry in the increased coverage of Democratic (Republican)
issues that is consistent with a corresponding Democratic (Republican) partisanship
of the newspaper.
This discussion can be summarised in the following denition:
Denition 1 A newspaper has a Democratic (Republican) partisanship if during
the presidential campaign it devotes more space to issues owned by the Democratic
(Republican) party, with no increased coverage of Republican (Democratic) issues.
It could be the case that during presidential campaigns the Times behaves dif-
ferently, as a function of the political a¢ liation of the incumbent President. In
fact, over and above the electoral partisanship of the newspaper, as described by
Denition 1, the e¤ects of the political a¢ liation of the incumbent President on is-
sue coverage could be given an interpretation within a lapdog/watchdog dichotomy.
The idea is the following: if it turns out that -during the presidential campaign- the
New York Times gives less emphasis to Democratic topics and/or more emphasis
to Republican topics when the incumbent is a Democrat, over and above its Demo-
cratic or Republican partisanship, this is consistent with the fact that the newsaper
acts as an electoral watchdog with respect to the incumbent President. This is so
because the newspaper di¤erentially focuses the attention away from topics over
which the incumbent President is on average perceived as strong, towards topics
over which he is perceived as weak.
On the contrary, if the newspaper di¤erentially gives more emphasis to Demo-
cratic topics and less to Republican ones when the incumbent is a Democrat, the
newspaper is said to behave as an electoral lapdog towards the incumbent President.
Again, this interaction e¤ect is additive with respect to the partisanship component.
This analysis can be summarised in the following denitions:
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Denition 2 A newspaper is an electoral lapdog of the incumbent President if,
ceteris paribus, during the presidential campaign it devotes more space to the issues
over which the incumbent is strong, and/or less to issues over which the incumbent
is weak.
Denition 3 A newspaper acts as an electoral watchdog if, ceteris paribus, dur-
ing the presidential campaign it dedicates more space to the issues over which the
incumbent is weak, and/or less space to the issues over which the incumbent is
strong.
4.3 A di¤erence in di¤erence approach
Given the three identifying assumptions stated above and the denitions introduced
in the preceding section, the electoral behaviour of the New York Times can be
analyzed through a di¤erence in di¤erence approach. In order to illustrate the link
between the estimated coe¢ cients and the denitions given in the previous section,
I will use a simple linear specication.
Let yDEMt be the relative frequency of stories about Democratic topics the Times
publishes during period t. One can write the following di¤erence in di¤erence
specication for yDEMt :
yDEMt = 0+11(incP t= D) + 21(Pcampt= 1)
+31(incP t= D & Pcampt= 1) + z
DEM
t +"t (1)
where 1(incPt = D) is a dummy that equals one when the incumbent President
at time t is a Democrat, 1(Pcampt = 1) is a dummy that equals one during the
presidential campaign period16, and the third dummy represents the interaction
term, i.e. it equals one when there is a presidential campaign and the incumbent
President is a Democrat; nally zDEMt stands for the relative frequency of Executive
Orders concerning Democratic topics enacted by the incumbent President at time
t, and "t is the error term.
In a specular fashion, one can write the following linear equation for yREPt , the
relative frequency of stories about Republican topics published by the Times during
period t:
yREPt = 0+11(incP t= R) + 21(Pcampt= 1)
+31(incP t= R & Pcampt= 1) + z
REP
t +t (2)
where 1(incP t= R) is a dummy for the incumbent President being a Republican,
1(Pcampt = 1) is dened as above, and the third dummy represents the interaction
between the presidential campaign and the incumbent President being a Republican;
16Across all specications presented in section 5, the presidential campaign dummy equals one
for the months of August, September and October immediately before the presidential elections.
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zREPt is the relative frequency of executive orders about Republican topics enacted
by the incumbent President during the time period, while t is the error term.
The coe¢ cient 1 on the rst dummy in equation (1) refers to the newspapers
behaviour on Democratic stories during the term, as a function of the political
colour of the incumbent President. If 1 turns out to be statistically di¤erent from
zero and positive, this is consistent with the newspaper nding it worthwhile to
emphasize Democratic issues when the incumbent President is a Democrat, even
after controlling for the pattern of Executive Orders. On the contrary, if 1 happens
to be negative, this is consistent with the fact that the newspaper is acting as a
permanent watchdog with respect to the incumbent. A parallel reasoning can be
applied to the coe¢ cient 1 in equation (2).
The partisan behaviour of the New York Times, as characterised by Denition 1,
can be disentangled by looking at the two coe¢ cients 2 and 2: if 2 is statistically
di¤erent from zero and positive, while 2 is not statistically di¤erent from zero or
negative, this is consistent with the newspaper having a Democratic partisanship.
Conversely, if 2 is statistically signicant and positive, while 2 is indistinguishable
from zero or negative, this is a symptom of the fact that the newspaper has a
Republican partisanship.
The interaction terms are meant to capture the di¤erential behaviour of the
newspaper during the presidential campaign, as a function of the political color of
the incumbent President. If 3 is positive and statistically signicant, this is con-
sistent with the fact that on Democratic topics the New York Times is captured
by the incumbent President during the presidential campaign, i.e. it acts as an
electoral lapdog. Conversely, if 3 is found to be negative and signicant, this is
consistent with the newspaper acting as an electoral watchdog of the incumbent
President during the presidential campaign, on Democratic issues. Again in a spec-
ular fashion, 3 represents the electoral lapdog or watchdog behaviour of the New
York Times on Republican topics. In fact, if 3 is found to be statistically signi-
cant and negative (positive), this is consistent with the New York Times acting as
an electoral watchdog (lapdog) of the incumbent President on Republican topics.
A pair of di¤erence in di¤erence tables can further clarify the interpretation of
the coe¢ cients:
Democratic topics campaign no campaign simple di¤erence
Democratic President yDDc = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 y
D
Dn = 0 + 1 y
D
D = 2 + 3
Republican President yDRc = 0 + 2 y
D
Rn = 0 y
D
R = 2
simple di¤erence yDDc   yDRc = 1 + 3 yDDn   yDRn = 1 yDD  yDR = 3
Republican topics campaign no campaign simple di¤erence
Republican President yRRc = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 y
R
Rn = 0 + 1 y
R
R = 2 + 3
Democratic President yRDc = 0 + 2 y
R
Dn = 0 y
R
D = 2
simple di¤erence yRDc   yRRc = 1 + 3 yRDn   yRRn = 1 yRD  yRR = 3
where the part concerning Executive Orders has been omitted for the sake of
clarity. The estimated 2 and 2 coe¢ cients can be directly read through Denition
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1. On the other hand, the di¤erential behaviour of the New York Times during the
presidential campaign as a function of the political a¢ liation of the incumbent
President is captured by 3 and 3.
The 1 and 1 coe¢ cients stand for the di¤erential behaviour of the New York
Times out of the presidential campaign, as a function of the political a¢ liation of
the incumbent President, on Democratic and Republican issues respectively.
4.4 Democratic vs Republican topics
Within the set of topics coded by Baumgartner and Jones in the New York Times
dataset, I classify the following issues as being owned by the Democrats:
1. Civil Rights
2. Health Care
3. Labor and Employment
4. Social Welfare
For every month, I count the total number of stories about these four topics;
this aggregate count represents the number of stories about Democratic topics.
Broadly following the survey evidence on issue ownership, I consider Law & Crime
and Defense as Republican issues, but I study them separately in the econometric
analysis proper, just because only the latter can be considered as a rm Republican
issue, while there is non negligible variation in the ownership status of the former,
as witnessed by Gallup and NES polls.
Apart from the unconditional, monthly count of stories about Democratic topics,
Defense and Law & Crime, I also interact the topic with various characteristics of
the stories themselves, as classied by Baumgartner and Jones. In the case of stories
about Democratic topics and Law & Crime, I consider domestic ones, stories that
deal with New York City, stories regarding the TriState, non-local stories (i.e. those
that do not deal with NYC or the TriState), front page ones and stories not on the
front page. On the other hand, in the case of Defense stories I consider the subset of
domestic stories, non-domestic ones, front page ones and stories on internal pages.
4.5 Econometric specication
In order to analyze the time series behaviour of the Times in the issue space, I
use a count data model. As it is standard in the literature (see Cameron and
Trivedi [1998] and Wooldridge [2001]), I adopt a Poisson model, with a log-linear
specication of the conditional expectation.
Let xDEMt be the count of stories about Democratic issues published by the
Times during period t. Its conditional expectation can be written as follows:
E(xDEMt
 zDEMt )= exp  0 + 11(incPt = D) + 21(Pcampt = 1)+31(inct = D & Pcampt = 1) + 0wDEMt

(3)
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where wDEMt is a set of controls. Equation (3) corresponds to equation (1), having
assumed a log-linear Poisson model.
By the same token, the conditional expectation for xREP dt , i.e. the count of
stories about Defense at time t, can be written as:
E(xREP dt
 zREP dt )= exp  0 + 11(incPt = R) + 21(Pcampt = 1)+31(inct = R & Pcampt = 1) +  0wREP dt

I adopt the same specication for xREP ct , namely the count of stories about
Law & Crime.
Regarding control variables, the presidential campaign dummy equals one for
the months of August, September and October immediately before the presidential
elections. The vectors wDEMt , w
REP d
t and w
REP c
t always include a linear and
quadratic time trend, a set of monthly dummies (January is the baseline month),
and the total number of stories at time t. This last variable should control for the
time-varying size of the Times. Moreover, wDEMt includes the relative frequency
of Executive Orders about Democratic issues enacted by the incumbent President
during period t. The same is true for wREP dt and w
REP c
t . For each sub-category
of stories (e.g. domestic stories about Democratic issues) I also control for the total
number of stories pertaining to that category that the Times publishes in each
period (in the example: total number of domestic stories per month). Given the
observed reversals in the ownership status of the Defense and Law & Crime issues
(see section 3.1 above), I include a separate dummy for the presidential campaigns
during which such reversals occur. These campaigns are 1964, 1980 and 1996 for
Defense, and 1976, 1992 and 1996 for Law & Crime. Finally, in order to control
for the underlying real world events, in the case of Defense stories I include the
number (expressed in thousands) of U.S. soldiers killed-in-action (KIA) during the
time period17.
Standard errors are calculated using the Huber/White sandwich formula, in
order to obtain inferences that are robust to non-Poisson heteroskedasticity.
5 Results
This section is divided in four parts. In the rst part I run the regressions with the
baseline specication I have mentioned above. In the second part I add controls
regarding the political situation at the local level and the identity of the New York
Times publisher. In the third subsection I focus on the more recent time sample,
i.e. from 1961 to 1997. In the last subsection I perform some robustness checks.
5.1 Baseline specication
The baseline results concerning Democratic topics and the two Republican ones are
featured on Table 5, 6 and 7. As mentioned above, the regression on topic i includes
as controls the relative frequency of executive orders on that topic enacted at time
17I thank Douglas Hibbs for kindly providing the KIA data.
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t , the total number of stories published at time t and appearing in the sample,
monthly dummies, and a linear and quadratic trend. In each table, the rst column
refers to all stories, while the subsequent ones stand for the di¤erent subcategories
of stories. In the latter case, I also control for the total number of stories pertaining
to that subcategory.
For each explanatory variable, the incidence rate ratio18 is reported, with robust
z-statistics in brackets.
The main message stemming from the joint examination of these tables is that
the New York Times systematically publishes more stories about Democratic top-
ics during presidential campaigns, but only so when the incumbent president is a
Republican. In fact, regarding the Republican issues of Defense and Law & Crime,
there is no systematic variation in the coverage during presidential campaigns. The
only exception is represented by front page stories. The Times publishes less front
page articles about Defense during the presidential campaign, when the incumbent
President is a Republican. On the other hand, there are more front page stories
about Law & Crime during the presidential campaign, when the incumbent presi-
dent is a Republican.
Apart from this latter result on front page stories about Crime, the overall
pattern is consistent with the New York Times showing a Democratic partisanship,
with some watchdog aspects, in that there is an increase in the count of stories about
Democratic topics during the presidential campaign, which occurs only when the
incumbent President is perceived as weak on these issues, i.e. he is a Republican.
In particular, when the incumbent President is a Republican, there are on av-
erage around 26.6 percent more stories about Democratic topics as the presidential
campaign kicks in (Table 5, column [1]). When signicant, the magnitude of the
e¤ect is comparable across di¤erent subsets of stories, apart from NYC ones: in this
case, there are more than double the number of stories about Democratic topics
during the presidential campaign and under a Republican incumbent. The e¤ect is
strongly signicant (one percent condence level) for all stories, NYC ones and those
not on the front page. It is signicant at 5 percent condence level for domestic
stories.
The interaction term is always estimated to be negative across all subcategories
of news (incidence rate ratios below one), and it is signicantly di¤erent from zero at
ordinary condence levels for all stories (10 percent) and domestic ones (5 percent).
In any case, one can never reject the hypothesis that the presidential campaign
does not produce any change in the count of stories about Democratic topics when
the incumbent President is a Democrat. This is shown by the p-value on the
corresponding t-test, which is reported below the coe¢ cients under each column in
Table 5.
Regarding the e¤ects of the political a¢ liation of the incumbent President on
Democratic stories, a consistent pattern emerges: during the term there are system-
18The incidence rate ratio represents the relative change in the dependent variable which is
associated with a unitary change of the explanatory variable. In the case of a dummy variable, an
incidence rate ratio of 1 + y, with y > 0, stands for the fact that there are on average y percent
more successes (in my case: stories) when the dummy equals one, as compared to the case when
the dummy equals zero.
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atically more stories about Democratic topics when the President is a Democrat,
even after controlling for presidential activity, as proxied by the relative frequency
of Executive Orders. There are on average around 18 percent more stories about
Democratic topics under a Democratic incumbent (Table 5, column [1]). The mag-
nitude of such an e¤ect is comparable for domestic stories, non-local stories and
stories not on the front page, while it is larger (more than 27 percent) for front
page ones. This larger coverage of Democratic topics during the term when the
President is a Democrat helps understand the results concerning the Times be-
haviour during the presidential campaign: when the incumbent is a Democrat the
aggregate aggregate count of stories about Democratic topics is already high out-
side the presidential campaign, and the presidential campaign does not produce any
additional e¤ect.
The fourth row in the table displays the e¤ect of the relative share of Executive
Orders. In only one cases out of seven is the incidence rate ratio larger than one,
indicating a positive correlation between the share of Executive Orders about De-
mocratic topics and the count of stories on the Times. However, this e¤ect is not
statistically signicant. The same holds true for the six cases in which the point
estimate of the incidence rate ratio is less than one.
Finally, it turns out that the larger is the newspaper (as proxied by the total
number of stories being sampled each month), the higher is the count of stories
about Democratic topics (column [1]): this is a scale e¤ect, which is very precisely
estimated. When considering the various subcategories of articles, it turns out
that the size of the newspaper is no longer signicantly correlated with the count
of stories about Democratic topics, while this is the case for the total number of
stories in each subcategory.
Table 6 shows estimation results for the Defense issue. The presidential cam-
paign dummy and the interaction are never signicantly correlated with the count
of stories about Defense (incidence rate ratios are indistinguishable from one). This
is also the case for the ownership-reversal dummy, which -as said above- equals
one for the 1964, 1980 and 1996 campaigns. However, it turns out that there are
systematically less Defense stories on the front page during the presidential cam-
paign, when the incumbent President is a Republican. This is witnessed by the fact
that the p-value on the corresponding t-test is around 0.05, thus rejecting the null
hypothesis of no e¤ects of the presidential campaign under a Republican incumbent.
In a parallel fashion to what found for stories about Democratic issues, it turns
out that there are systematically more stories about Defense when the incumbent
President is a Republican. This correlation is signicant at ordinary condence level
for all categories of news but domestic ones. The point estimates imply that there
are around 10 percent more articles about Defense under a Republican incumbent
than a Democrat, if one considers all stories, non-domestic ones and stories on
internal pages. Such increase amounts to 20 percent in the case of front page
stories.
Moreover, one should notice that the correlation between Defense stories and
Executive Orders is always estimated to be positive, but is larger in magnitude and
statistically signicant only for domestic stories. On the other hand, the number
of killed in action (KIA) is a strongly signicant and positive predictor of Defense
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stories, for all categories of news.
Regarding Law & Crime stories (see Table 7), the coe¢ cients on the presidential
campaign dummy and the interaction are never signicantly di¤erent from zero
(incidence rate ratios di¤erent from one). This holds for the ownership-reversal
dummy as well. In fact, when the incumbent President is a Republican, there
are signicantly more front page articles about Law & Crime as the presidential
campaign kicks in. In particular, one can reject the null hypothesis of no e¤ects of
the presidential campaign under a Republican incumbent.
Finally, the correlation between Law & Crime articles and Executive Orders is
always estimated to be positive, but it is statistically signicant only for the subset
of domestic stories.
5.2 Additional controls: New York State Governor, New
York City Mayor and publishers identity
As discussed in section 3.2, the New York Times can be considered the main news-
paper for the city of New York, and for the states of New York, Connecticut and
New Jersey (the TriState area). Hence, one would like to check whether the results
obtained in the preceding section are robust to the inclusion of controls related to
the political situation in New York City and in the State of New York, which is the
most important one within the TriState area. In particular, the idea is to control
for the political a¢ liation of the incumbent Governor of New York State, and of
the incumbent New York City Mayor.
Secondly, the ownership structure of the Times could have e¤ects on the equi-
librium supply of stories. The New York Times was founded in 1851 by Henry J.
Raymond and George Jones, and in 1896 was bought by Adolph S. Ochs. Since
then, the Ochs-Sulzberger family has continuously kept the ownership of the news-
paper. However, in the time span that is covered by the dataset, four di¤erent
members of the Ochs Sulzberger family have played the role of publisher: Arthur
Hays Sulzberger, son-in-law of Adolph S. Ochs, from April 1935 to April 1961, Orvil
Dryfoos, son-in-law of Arthur Hays Sulzberger, from May 1961 to May 1963, Arthur
Ochs Sulzberger, from June 1963 to January 1992, and nally Arthur Sulzberger
Jr., son of Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, from February 1992 to nowadays.
In Table 8 the monthly count of stories about Democratic topics is regressed
against the set of variables being used in Tables 5, plus ve additional dummies,
that control for the political a¢ liation of the incumbent NYS Governor, of the
incumbent NYC Mayor, and the publishers identity. The NYS Governor dummy
equals one when the incumbent is a Democrat, and zero otherwise. The same
applies to the NYC Mayor dummy19. Regarding the publishers identity, I use three
di¤erent dummies for the last three publishers, and leave Arthur Hays Sulzberger
as the baseline publisher.
Tables 9 and 10 display results for the count of stories about Defense and Law
& Crime, respectively. Here the dummy variables for the political a¢ liation of the
19Vincent R. Impellitteri was Mayor of New York City from 1950 to 1953, and was in fact elected
as an Independent. However, given his lifelong a¢ liation to the Democratic Party, I have coded
him as a Democrat.
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incumbent NYS Governor and NYC Mayor equal one for a Republican incumbent.
The joint inspection of these three tables conrms the ndings obtained with
the baseline specication. There are systematically more stories about Democratic
topics during the presidential campaign, but less so when the incumbent President
is a Democrat. In fact, one still cannot reject at ordinary condence levels the null
hypothesis of no e¤ects of the presidential campaign under a Democratic incumbent.
The size and level of signicance of the coe¢ cients on the presidential campaign
dummy and the interaction are very similar to those found under the baseline
specication.
On the other hand, some discrepancies emerge when looking at the partial cor-
relation with the political a¢ liation of the incumbent President. It is still the case
that -during the term- there are more stories about Democratic issues when the
President happens to be a Democrat, but the size of the coe¢ cient and the sig-
nicance level are smaller than the ones obtained with the baseline specication.
The point estimate for all stories and domestic ones implies a 10 percent increase
in the coverage of Democratic topics when the incumbent President is a Democrat,
which should be compared with a 18 percent increase in the baseline regression.
The only exception to this pattern of decreased size and signicance occurs with
TriState stories: when controlling for the political a¢ liation of the NYS Governor
and NYC mayor, there are on average around 39 percent more Democratic stories
under the presidency of a Democrat. This is coupled with a 77 percent increase
in the coverage of TriState stories about Democratic issues, when the incumbent
NYS Governor is a Democrat (Table 8, column [4]). Both partial correlations are
strongly signicant. Moreover, if one considers all stories, there are 10 percent more
articles about Democratic issues when the incumbent NYS Governor is a Democrat.
The correlation of Democratic stories with the political colour of the incumbent
NYC Mayor shows an opposite pattern: there are signicantly less articles about
Democratic issues under a Democratic NYC Mayor, i.e. the Times appears to act
as a permanent watchdog towards Republican NYC Mayors.
Finally, there are systematically more stories about Democratic topics under the
last two publishers, i.e. Arthur Ochs Sulzberger and Arthur Sulzberger Junior. The
e¤ect is large and precisely estimated for all stories, domestic and non-local ones.
Regarding Defense stories, there are no signicant e¤ects of the presidential
campaign and of the campaign interacted with the political a¢ liation of the incum-
bent President. Again, the only exception occurs with front page stories. There
are systematically less Defense stories on the front page during the presidential
campaign, when the incumbent President is a Republican, as shown by the p-value
on the corresponding t-test (Table 9, column [4]).
Similarly to what found with the baseline specication, there are signicantly
more stories about Defense when the incumbent President is a Republican. The
coe¢ cient is now larger and more precisely estimated, with the exception of front
page stories. In particular, if one considers all stories (column [1]) there are around
27 percent more Defense stories under the Presidency of a Republican. On the other
hand, there is no signicant correlation between Defense stories and the political
a¢ liation of the NYS Governor, while there systematically more Defense articles
when the incumbent NYCMayor is a Republican. Regarding the publisherse¤ects,
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the second and the third publisher are associated with signicantly more stories
about Defense.
Coming to the Law&Crime issue, Table 10 shows that the presidential campaign
dummy and the interaction term between the campaign and the political a¢ liation
of the President are not signicantly correlated with the count of stories about the
topic, for all categories of news. This is also the case for the ownership-reversal
dummy. As with the baseline specication, there are more front page stories about
Law and Crime during the campaign when the incumbent President is a Republican.
Finally, there is some positive and signicant correlation between Law & Crime
stories and the incumbent NYC Mayor being a Republican (for all stories, domestic
and TriState ones), and the same is true for the last two publishers.
5.3 The New York Timesbehaviour as of the 60s
The purpose of this section is to investigate the editorial choices of the Times in
more recent years, namely from 1961 to 1997. A closer look to the behaviour of
the New York Times as of the 60s is motivated by the availability of more detailed
pieces of information about issue ownership. Moreover, as illustrated in section 3.1,
the issue of Civil Rights clearly emerges as a Democratic one only with the Kennedy
and Johnson presidency.
In the present exercise I control for the same set of additional variables I have
used in the previous section, i.e. the political a¢ liation of the incumbent NYS
Governor and NYC Mayor, and the publishers identity.
Table 11 displays results about Democratic stories. The overall pattern of nd-
ings quite closely corresponds to the ones obtained with the previous specication.
During the presidential campaign there are more stories about Democratic topics,
but only so when the incumbent President is a Republican. The magnitude of the
e¤ect is in fact larger during the more recent time span. If one considers all stories,
the Times publishes around 33 percent more Democratic stories during the cam-
paign under a Republican incumbent, and 27 percent more in the case of domestic
stories. Regarding NYC stories, the increase in the coverage of Democratic topics
during the presidential campaign is more than threefold. In the post-1960 period,
there is also a statistically signicant increase in the count of front page stories
about Democratic issues. The size of the e¤ect is large, with a more than twofold
increase. The interaction term between the presidential campaign dummy and the
political a¢ liation of the incumbent President is signicant at the 5 percent level
for domestic stories and NYC ones.
Outside of the presidential campaign, again there are more stories about De-
mocratic issues under the presidency of a Democrat. If one considers all stories,
there are on average around 13 percent more Democratic stories under a Democratic
President. In the post-1960 subsample there is a larger and more signicant positive
correlation between the count of stories about Democratic topics and the incumbent
NYS Governor being a Democrat. In particular, there are around twice the number
of TriState stories under a Democratic NYS Governor, and almost three times the
number of front page stories. The negative correlation between Democratic stories
and the incumbent NYC Mayor being a Democrat is conrmed in the more recent
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subsample, as the positive correlation with the last two publishers.
Regarding stories about Defense, Table 12 shows a pattern of results that is
quite di¤erent from the one found when analysing the entire time sample. When
the incumbent President is a Democrat and there is no reversal in the ownership
of the issue, the Times systematically publishes more stories about Defense, as the
presidential campaign starts. Such result should be taken with some caution, just
because -in the post-1960 period- the only presidential year under a Democratic
incumbent during which there is no reversal in the ownership of the Defense issue
is 1968, i.e. in the middle of the Vietnam War.
The e¤ect of the 1968 campaign is strongly signicant (one percent condence
level) and large in magnitude for all stories, domestic ones and those not on the
front page. The correlation is smaller and slightly less signicant for non-domestic
stories. On the other hand, the coe¢ cient on the ownership reversal dummy, when
signicantly di¤erent from zero (as it is the case for domestic stories and those on
internal pages), is estimated to be negative.
The coe¢ cient on the interaction between the presidential campaign and the
incumbent President being a Republican is estimated to be negative (incidence rate
ratios less than one) and signicantly so for all categories of stories but front page
ones. In particular, for all stories and front page ones one can reject at the 10
percent level the null hypothesis that the Times does not change the coverage of
Defense stories during the presidential campaign under a Republican incumbent.
The joint inspection of the incidence rate ratios suggests that there is indeed a
decrease in the count of all stories and front page ones about Defense. Below the
p-values on the test about the e¤ect of the campaign under a Republican President,
I report the p-values of a similar test on whether there is a change in the count
of Defense stories during the presidential campaigns that are characterised by a
reversal in the ownership of the issue. At ordinary condence levels one can never
reject the null hypothesis of no e¤ects.
Finally it must be noticed that outside of the presidential campaign there are
systematically more Defense stories when the incumbent President is a Republi-
can, around 50 percent. The correlation is very precisely estimated (one percent
condence level) for all but front page stories. Overall, the set of estimated coef-
cient is consistent with a watchdog attitude of the Times during the presidential
campaign, as there are more Defense stories during the 1968 campaign, while there
is a decrease in such count during the campaign when the incumbent President is
perceived as more competent on the issue, i.e. he is a Republican. Moreover, in
those campaign years that are characterised by a reversal in the ownership of the
issue, the Times is marginally less inclined to publish stories about it.
Table 13 presents results about Law & Crime stories. As with the entire time
sample, there are no remarkable movements in count of stories about the issue
during presidential campaigns. Similarly to what found in Table 10, when the
incumbent President is a Republican and the presidential campaign starts there are
signicantly more front page stories about Law & Crime. This is also the case for
TriState stories. Di¤erently from previous results, there are systematically more
non-local stories about the issue under the incumbency of a Republican President.
Finally, there are more Law & Crime stories under a Republican NYC Mayor and
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under the last publisher.
5.4 Robustness checks
One relevant concern about the validity of these ndings is that the autocorrelation
of the right hand side variables might excessively deate the estimated standard
errors. In order to address this issue, I have run all regressions on collapsed data20.
To do so, I calculate the average of all variables for each presidential term and each
campaign, so that I am left with 27 observations for the entire sample, and 18 for
the post-1960 period. On this collapsed data I have run Poisson regressions, with
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The results obtained in the previous sections are robust to this check. In Table
14 I summarise the results of the exercise on Democratic topics, Defense and Law
& Crime, when the baseline specication (see section 5.1 above) is applied to all
stories21, both for the entire time sample and the post-1960 period.
Consistently with what done before, the incumbent President dummy equals
one under a Democratic President when dealing with Democratic stories (Table
14, columns [1] and [4]), vice versa for Defense and Law & Crime stories. The
interaction term between the presidential campaign dummy and the incumbent
President one is dened accordingly.
Regarding Democratic issues, there are systematically more articles about them
during the presidential campaign, when the incumbent President is a Republican.
The coe¢ cient on the presidential campaign dummy is highly signicant for both
the entire sample and the more recent period, with one and 5 percent condence
level respectively. The point estimates imply a 22 percent and a 25 percent increase
in the coverage of these topics during the campaign, under the incumbency of a
Republican President. The coe¢ cients on the interaction term are estimated to be
negative (incidence rate ratios less than one), but not signicantly so22. Again, in
both cases one cannot reject at ordinary condence level the null hypothesis that
the presidential campaign does not produce any change in the count of Democratic
stories under a Democratic President.
When considering the entire time sample, Defense stories do not display any
systematic change during the presidential campaign (column [2]), as in Table 6.
The coe¢ cient on the ownership reversal dummy is in fact mildly signicant at 10
percent level, implying a 45 percent increase in the count of Defense stories during
the presidential campaign when such reversal occurs. However, a joint test on the
presidential campaign dummy and the ownership reversal one cannot reject the null
hypothesis that there is no overall change in the count of Defense stories, during
the presidential campaigns that are characterised by such reversal. Apart from
this, number of KIA and the relative frequency of Executive Orders are strongly
and signicantly correlated with the count of Defense articles.
20See Bertrand et al. [2004] for a full discussion of the issue.
21Results on the di¤erent subcategories of news are available upon request.
22In fact, in the case of domestic stories (not reported in the table) the interaction term is
signicantly di¤erent from zero at one percent condence level for the entire sample, and at 5
percent for the post-1960 one.
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On the other hand, in the post-1960 sample the analysis of the collapsed dataset
shows that there are systematically less stories about Defense during the presiden-
tial campaign, when the incumbent President is a Republican. The e¤ect is large
and very precisely estimated (one percent condence level). Under a Republican
President there are systematically more stories about Defense. The magnitude and
signicance of these two e¤ects correspond to what found on the original dataset
(see section 5.3). This is not the case for the presidential campaign dummy, which
should account for the 1968 campaign: its coe¢ cient is estimated to be positive
(incidence rate ratio larger than one), but is not statistically signicant. The same
is true for the ownership reversal dummy.
Finally, stories about Law & Crime display the same (absence of) pattern that
has been discussed in the previous sections. However, if one considers the entire time
sample (column [3]), it turns out that there more stories about the topic during the
presidential campaign when the incumbent President is a Republican. The e¤ect is
mildly signicant at the 10 percent condence level.
6 Discussion and conclusions
This paper provides new evidence about the political behaviour of the New York
Times, by analysing the time series variation in the count of stories about politically
relevant topics. The main nding is that the Times displays a Democratic partisan-
ship, with some watchdog aspects. This is the case, because there are systematically
more stories about Civil Rights, Health Care, Labour and Social Welfare during the
presidential campaign, but only so when the incumbent President is a Republican.
This is true for both the entire sample and the more recent 1961-1997 subperiod.
When looking at the entire 1946-1997 sample, the Democratic partisanship hy-
pothesis nds conrmation in the fact that there is no comparable variation during
the presidential campaign in the count of stories about Defense and Law & Crime,
which -as broadly conrmed by the analysis of Gallup Polls and the NES- represent
more favorable issues for the GOP.
On the other hand, there are signs of a more symmetric watchdog behaviour
of the Times when considering the more recent period, just because the Defense
issue is covered more heavily during the presidential campaign when the incumbent
President is a Democrat and there is no reversal in the ownership of the issue itself.
In fact, when the President is a Republican, there are less Defense stories overall
and on the front page as the presidential campaign starts. A caveat here is that
the only presidential campaign under a Democratic incumbent with no ownership
reversal is the 1968 one, i.e. in the middle of the Vietnam War.
Within the growing empirical literature on mass media bias, the methodology I
have applied here to the New York Times has three novel features. First, it is focused
on the agenda-setting behaviour of the newspaper, i.e. on its issue coverage. Such
agenda-setting framework, coupled with the issue ownership hypothesis, provides a
natural way to think about the political stance of the newspaper.
Secondly, my empirical analysis crucially exploits the time variation in the issue
coverage by the Times, in order to understand how such coverage changes during
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the presidential campaign period. Thirdly, given the sample length, I am able to
provide additional evidence about the di¤erential behaviour of the Times during
presidential campaigns as a function of the political a¢ liation of the incumbent
President.
How do my ndings relate to the theoretical literature on mass media bias? It is
clearly the case that the systematic variations in the editorial choices of the Times I
have shown to occur during presidential campaigns are consistent with media bias,
i.e. with a precise political stance of the newspaper, which emerges outside the
editorialspage proper. However, given the structure of the available data, it is
hard to test the empirical validity of supply-led stories á la Baron against demand-
driven ones, as those suggested by Mullainathan and Shleifer, and Gentzkow and
Shapiro. Moreover, one cannot rule out the role played by the political bias of the
owner, especially in the case of a newspaper like the Times. This latter argument is
corroborated by the fact that some of the changes in the publishers identity have a
systematic impact on the count of stories about Democratic topics and -to a lesser
extent- about Law & Crime.
The idea of a watchdog behaviour by news providers is quite well established
within the journalism literature23, where it works as a normative benchmark, but
it also appears in the political economy one24.
In this case too both a supply and a demand-led story would be compatible
with the data. Journalists and publishers alike could trade o¤ monetary rewards
against the moral payo¤of acting as watchdogs with respect to the incumbent
government. On the other hand, readers and viewers might be exactly demanding a
more intense coverage of issues over which there is more uncertainty regarding the
incumbents performance. It could also be the case that consumers of news hold a
priori beliefs about what policy areas are more likely to be characterised by a poor
performance by the incumbent. A desire to see news providers conrming these
beliefs, or a Bayesian inclination to attach a higher expectation of quality reporting
to those that do so could contribute to explaining what I denote as a watchdog
behaviour during presidential campaigns.
Apart from devising an empirical strategy that can disentangle these di¤erent
theories of media bias, much work remains to be done. On the intensive side, one
would like to go beyond an identication strategy that is based on agenda setting,
and instead try and classify the way issues are framed by the media. A problem with
this strategy is in fact the one of inter-coder reliability, which is much less severe
in the case of agenda-setting proper. On the extensive side, one could apply the
present methodology to other mass media outlets, in particular to a panel of them.
The idea is to estimate the xed e¤ects of their position in the political spectrum,
by looking at the average balance of stories about conservative and liberal topics,
over and above the study of their time series behaviour.
23See for example Bennett and Serrin [2005].
24Such concept of media as watchdogs is central in the Downsian setup of Chan and Suen
[2003] and it is largely implicit in the political agency framework of Besley and Burgess [2002] and
Besley and Prat [2005].
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Table 1: Perceived Issue Handling Competence of Parties, Democrats' advantage
civil rights welfare health care law & crime defense
1948 . . . . -0.58
1952 . . . . -24.85
1956 2.42 . . . .
1960 3.46 . . . -16.24
1964 34.94 . . . 41.95
1968 11.11 . . . -14.10
1972 10.94 (NES) 27.36 (NES) . -23.82 -20.95
1976 16.98 30.11 . 9.15 (NES) -14.59
1980 25.55 25.08 . -15 (NES) 8.81
1984 29.81 34.67 . -38.89 (NES) -8.24
1988 23.26 29.40 . -9.30 -5.76
1992 16.76 35.30 27.88 3.94 -44.32
1996 14.46 16.65 21.12 9.79 8.15
Notes: for each issue and each presidential year, I report the difference between the percentage of respondents believing that a Democrat would be better
able of handling that issue and the percentage of respondents believing that a Republican would be. When not stated otherwise, the data come from Gallup
polls, as detailed in table A.1 and A.2. NES data are presented in table A.3. Issue ownership figures that do not conform with Petrocik [1996] are highlighted. 
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Table 2: Relative frequencies of stories on the New York Times (1946-1997), by topic and geographical location
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Major Topic All stories NYC stories TriState stories Non-local stories
15 Banking, Finance and Dom. Commerce 15.14 6.00 7.12 16.91
19 International Affairs 13.10 1.29 0.41 15.64
20 Federal Government Operations 8.16 1.57 3.79 9.29
16 Defense 7.35 1.01 1.23 8.64
28 Arts and Entertainment 6.34 5.66 2.63 6.81
12 Law, Crime and Family Issues 5.72 15.12 11.30 4.18
24 State and Local Government Admin. 5.21 21.13 26.77 1.31
99 Other 4.80 4.56 2.69 5.05
6 Education 3.98 9.37 8.20 2.99
10 Transportation 3.48 6.63 5.78 2.91
3 Health 2.98 4.18 5.02 2.64
5 Labor & Employment 2.68 2.96 2.89 2.63
17 Space, Science, Technology and Comm. 2.19 0.69 0.79 2.50
18 Foreign Trade 2.13 0.13 0.26 2.54
8 Energy 2.01 1.16 2.07 2.09
2 Civil Rights 1.98 1.82 2.13 1.98
14 Sports and Recreation 1.88 0.82 1.78 2.00
1 Community Development & Housing 1.81 8.17 5.17 0.81
30 Macroeconomics 1.78 0.19 0.50 2.07
29 Death Notices 1.73 0.25 0.61 2.00
7 Environment 1.42 1.82 3.39 1.16
31 Churches and Religion 1.29 1.35 0.96 1.32
4 Agriculture 1.07 0.35 0.93 1.16
13 Social Welfare 0.68 1.35 1.72 0.50
21 Public Lands and Water Management 0.64 1.13 1.28 0.52
27 Fires 0.25 1.07 0.44 0.14
26 Weather and Natural Disasters 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.20
100 8.27 8.91 82.83
DEM Democratic topics 8.32 10.31 11.76 7.75
REP Republican topics 13.07 16.13 12.52 12.82
Notes: Democratic stories comprise Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare ones. Republican stories comprise Defense and Law & Crime
ones. 
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Table 3: Relative frequencies of stories on the New York Times (1946-1997): front page and internal pages
[1] [2] [3]
Major Topic
19 International Affairs 13.10 12.74 18.37
20 Federal Government Operations 8.16 7.69 15.23
16 Defense 7.35 6.82 15.19
24 State and Local Government Admin. 5.21 5.07 7.35
12 Law, Crime, and Family Issues 5.72 5.72 5.78
15 Banking, Finance and Dom. Commerce 15.14 15.90 3.76
5 Labor & Employment 2.68 2.62 3.59
1 Macroeconomics 1.78 1.70 2.89
10 Transportation 3.48 3.52 2.81
2 Civil Rights 1.98 1.93 2.77
6 Education 3.98 4.07 2.72
8 Energy 2.01 1.98 2.48
18 Foreign Trade 2.13 2.12 2.39
3 Health 2.98 3.04 2.15
14 Community Development and Housing 1.81 1.79 1.98
17 Space, Science, Technology & Comm. 2.19 2.22 1.86
99 Other 4.80 5.02 1.49
28 Arts and Entertainment 6.34 6.69 1.16
31 Churches and Religion 1.29 1.30 1.16
13 Social Welfare 0.68 0.65 1.11
4 Agriculture 1.07 1.07 1.07
7 Environment 1.42 1.45 0.95
30 Death Notices 1.73 1.81 0.54
29 Sports and Recreation 1.88 1.98 0.41
21 Public Lands and Water Management 0.64 0.66 0.29
26 Weather and Natural Disasters 0.20 0.19 0.29
27 Fires 0.25 0.25 0.25
100 93.70 6.30
DEM Democratic topics 8.32 8.23 9.62
REP Republican topics 13.07 12.54 20.97
All stories Stories not on the 
front page
Front page stories
Notes: Democratic stories comprise Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare ones. Republican stories comprise Defense and
Law & Crime ones. 
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Table 4: Relative frequencies of Executive Orders, 1946-1997
[1] [2] [3]
Major Topic
20 Federal Government Operations 23.43 21.50 25.76
16 Defense 20.79 21.34 20.13
19 International Affairs 11.35 11.31 11.39
5 Labor & Employment 9.56 11.58 7.12
21 Public Lands and Water Manag. 6.16 7.08 5.05
18 Foreign Trade 4.40 3.81 5.11
2 Civil Rights 4.05 4.93 2.98
15 Banking, Finance and Dom. Commerce 2.43 1.82 3.17
1 Macroeconomics 2.38 1.93 2.91
10 Transportation 2.35 2.20 2.52
8 Energy 2.29 2.36 2.20
17 Space, Science, Tech. & Comm. 1.94 1.72 2.20
12 Law, Crime, and Family 1.70 1.72 1.68
7 Environment 1.58 1.61 1.55
14 Community Development and Housing 1.50 1.29 1.75
3 Health 1.44 1.93 0.84
4 Agriculture 1.03 0.86 1.23
6 Education 1.00 0.80 1.23
13 Social Welfare 0.65 0.21 1.17
DEM Executive Orders on Democratic topics 15.69 18.66 12.10
REP Executive Orders on Republican topics 22.49 23.06 21.81
Entire sample Democratic 
Presidents
Republican 
Presidents
Notes: Democratic topics comprise Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare. Republican topics comprise Defense and
Law & Crime. 
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Table 5: Poisson estimates for count of stories on Democratic topics, baseline specification
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
all stories domestic stories non-local stories TriState stories NYC stories
Incumbent President is a Democrat 1.179*** 1.192*** 1.183*** 1.105 1.204 1.275* 1.167***
[4.32] [4.29] [3.93] [0.81] [1.38] [1.69] [3.94]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.266*** 1.231** 1.167 1.091 2.635*** 1.68 1.246***
[2.90] [2.49] [1.64] [0.28] [3.72] [1.33] [2.69]
0.810* 0.762** 0.848 0.891 0.541 0.475 0.834
[1.71] [2.48] [1.13] [0.24] [1.46] [1.16] [1.52]
0.934 0.955 0.911 0.828 1.335 0.772 0.948
[0.76] [0.50] [0.92] [0.65] [0.93] [0.69] [0.62]
total number of stories 1.014*** 1.004 0.999 1 0.995 0.997 0.999
[18.78] [1.15] [0.21] [0.06] [1.52] [0.90] [0.08]
- 1.014*** 1.019*** 1.113*** 1.166*** 1.226*** 1.016**
[2.67] [3.86] [5.36] [7.59] [7.98] [2.23]
0.82 0.5 0.94 0.94 0.37 0.69 0.72
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.16
interaction: Presidential campaign & 
incumbent President is a Democrat
p value for no effects of the campaign when 
the incumbent is a Democrat
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Democratic topics (Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare), for different categories of news. For
each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with robust z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.
front page stories stories not on the 
front page
relative frequency of Executive Orders
total number of stories in the considered 
subset
37
Table 6: Poisson estimates for count of stories on Defense, baseline specification
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
all stories domestic stories
Incumbent President is a Republican 1.102** 1.095 1.118** 1.220* 1.089*
[2.02] [1.10] [2.03] [1.82] [1.65]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.064 1.09 1.069 0.879 1.092
[0.35] [0.47] [0.38] [0.35] [0.43]
0.806 0.694 0.923 0.573 0.846
[1.09] [1.35] [0.39] [1.14] [0.73]
1.029 1.04 1.08 0.86 1.056
[0.11] [0.14] [0.27] [0.26] [0.20]
monthly Killed In Action (KIA), thousands 1.348*** 1.147** 1.472*** 1.359*** 1.341***
[6.70] [2.53] [6.48] [3.31] [6.14]
1.127 1.430** 1.069 1.014 1.129
[1.16] [2.35] [0.55] [0.06] [1.11]
total number of stories 1.014*** 0.998 0.997 0.998 1
[15.23] [0.34] [1.48] [1.08] [0.03]
- 1.020** 1.063*** 1.224*** 1.016
[2.37] [8.66] [11.26] [1.47]
0.22 0.2 0.92 0.07 0.54
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.22
non-domestic 
stories
front page stories stories not on the 
front page
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent 
President is a Republican
p value for no effects of the campaign when the 
incumbent is a Republican
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Defense, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios
(IRR) are reported, with robust z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5%
(10%) significance.
dummy for campaign years with issue 
ownership reversal ('64, '80, '96)
total number of stories in the considered subset
relative frequency of Executive Orders
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Table 7: Poisson estimates for count of stories on Law & Crime, baseline specification
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
all stories domestic stories non-local stories TriState stories NYC stories
Incumbent President is a Republican 0.978 0.963 1.022 0.821 1.031 0.954 0.982
[0.48] [0.78] [0.34] [1.52] [0.29] [0.23] [0.39]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.005 1.033 0.899 1.433 1.107 1.801 0.956
[0.03] [0.18] [0.45] [1.00] [0.33] [1.09] [0.26]
1.127 0.956 1.31 1.08 0.731 1.36 1.111
[0.62] [0.24] [1.06] [0.22] [0.79] [0.53] [0.56]
0.966 1.071 0.907 1.358 0.763 0.346 1.034
[0.21] [0.40] [0.51] [0.87] [0.51] [1.05] [0.20]
1.215 1.400* 1.181 1.667 1.22 1.723 1.182
[1.01] [1.76] [0.67] [1.11] [0.37] [0.73] [0.86]
total number of stories 1.015*** 1.005 0.992 1.006* 1.001 1.003 1
[15.22] [0.98] [1.46] [1.78] [0.31] [0.86] [0.05]
- 1.015** 1.026*** 1.110*** 1.146*** 1.213*** 1.016*
[2.13] [3.70] [6.70] [8.53] [7.17] [1.75]
0.36 0.92 0.36 0.11 0.49 0.03 0.65
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.15
front page stories stories not on the 
front page
dummy for campaign years with issue 
ownership reversal ('76, '92, '96)
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Law & Crime, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported,
with robust z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.
interaction: Presidential campaign & 
incumbent President is a Republican
relative frequency of Executive Orders
p value for no effects of the campaign 
when the incumbent is a Republican
total number of stories in the considered 
subset
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Table 8: Poisson estimates for count of stories on Democratic topics, controlling for NYS Governor, NYC Mayor and NYT publisher
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
all stories domestic stories non-local stories tristate stories NYC stories
Incumbent President is a Democrat 1.110** 1.101* 1.05 1.389** 1.265 1.176 1.100*
[2.18] [1.91] [0.85] [2.18] [1.42] [0.84] [1.90]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.267*** 1.230** 1.172* 1.033 2.613*** 1.683 1.246***
[2.96] [2.54] [1.69] [0.10] [3.72] [1.34] [2.80]
0.802* 0.755** 0.84 0.891 0.513 0.465 0.825
[1.69] [2.49] [1.11] [0.25] [1.60] [1.18] [1.53]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Democrat 1.103* 1.08 0.974 1.774*** 1.326 1.17 1.097
[1.68] [1.28] [0.43] [3.46] [1.34] [0.69] [1.56]
0.863** 0.877** 0.933 0.610*** 0.646* 1.058 0.847***
[2.45] [2.11] [1.05] [2.75] [1.90] [0.25] [2.70]
Orvil Dryfoos publisher dummy 0.928 0.917 1.038 0.544 0.515 0.915 0.925
[0.58] [0.66] [0.25] [1.18] [1.19] [0.19] [0.54]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.305** 1.378*** 1.428** 0.591 1.108 1.927 1.256*
[2.25] [2.68] [2.54] [1.27] [0.23] [1.30] [1.83]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.483** 1.655*** 1.808*** 0.427 0.78 2.242 1.437*
[2.10] [2.69] [2.70] [1.30] [0.35] [1.04] [1.90]
0.9 0.45 0.91 0.83 0.46 0.67 0.81
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.17
front page stories stories not on the 
front page
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Democratic topics (Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare), for different categories of news. For each
explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5%
(10%) significance.
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent 
President is a Democrat
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Democrat
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign 
when the incumbent President is a Democrat
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Table 9: count of stories on Defense, controlling for NYS Governor, NYC Mayor and NYT publisher
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
all stories domestic stories
Incumbent President is a Republican 1.274*** 1.212* 1.319*** 1.214 1.268***
[3.55] [1.75] [3.62] [1.21] [3.21]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.071 1.115 1.083 0.843 1.103
[0.39] [0.58] [0.43] [0.45] [0.48]
0.838 0.69 0.98 0.617 0.877
[0.86] [1.37] [0.09] [0.99] [0.56]
1.073 1.012 1.119 0.95 1.096
[0.28] [0.04] [0.40] [0.09] [0.34]
monthly Killed In Action (KIA), thousands 1.311*** 1.153*** 1.418*** 1.277** 1.310***
[6.51] [2.64] [6.14] [2.14] [6.04]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Republican 0.929 1.106 0.885 1.002 0.926
[0.99] [0.87] [1.52] [0.01] [0.97]
1.138 0.903 1.151* 1.214 1.115
[1.59] [0.79] [1.70] [1.01] [1.29]
Orvil Dryfoos publisher dummy 1.642*** 1.23 1.765*** 1.057 1.678***
[2.96] [0.78] [2.88] [0.15] [2.72]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.880*** 1.289 2.336*** 1.126 1.972***
[3.60] [0.97] [4.42] [0.29] [3.52]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.378 1.439 1.483 0.451 1.491
[1.11] [0.84] [1.18] [0.96] [1.32]
0.4 0.22 0.67 0.07 0.81
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.19 0.23
non-domestic 
stories
front page stories stories not on the 
front page
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Defense, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are
reported, with robust z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent President 
is a Republican
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Republican
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign when 
the incumbent President is a Republican
dummy for campaign years with issue ownership reversal 
('64, '80, '96)
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Table 10: count of stories on Law & Crime, controlling for presidential activity, NYS Governor, NYC Mayor and NYT publisher
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
all stories domestic stories non-local stories tristate stories NYC stories
Incumbent President is a Republican 1.025 1.029 1.094 0.804 1.016 1.011 1.029
[0.42] [0.46] [1.11] [1.33] [0.10] [0.04] [0.47]
Presidential campaign dummy 0.988 1.02 0.913 1.316 0.986 1.658 0.942
[0.07] [0.11] [0.38] [0.76] [0.05] [0.94] [0.34]
1.165 0.98 1.331 1.082 0.8 1.445 1.147
[0.78] [0.10] [1.09] [0.22] [0.58] [0.64] [0.71]
0.954 1.045 0.822 1.663 0.865 0.317 1.02
[0.27] [0.25] [0.99] [1.39] [0.27] [1.08] [0.11]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Republican 0.931 0.902 0.819** 0.829 1.242 0.972 0.931
[1.04] [1.44] [2.07] [1.03] [1.49] [0.10] [1.02]
1.122* 1.188** 1.007 1.810*** 1.206 1.176 1.113
[1.67] [2.29] [0.09] [3.15] [1.23] [0.54] [1.54]
Orvil Dryfoos publisher dummy 0.779 0.808 0.938 0.823 0.477 0.249 0.834
[1.08] [0.92] [0.25] [0.36] [1.59] [1.30] [0.80]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.452** 1.529** 1.890*** 0.99 0.963 1.167 1.471**
[2.08] [2.29] [2.65] [0.02] [0.11] [0.26] [2.03]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.437 1.556* 2.180** 0.523 0.629 1.655 1.441
[1.50] [1.74] [2.57] [0.98] [0.81] [0.52] [1.43]
0.3 1 0.28 0.2 0.42 0.03 0.56
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.1 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.16
front page stories stories not on the 
front page
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent President 
is a Republican
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Republican
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign when 
the incumbent President is a Republican
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Law & Crime, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with robust z
statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.
dummy for campaign years with issue ownership reversal 
('76, '92, '96)
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Table 11: count of stories on Democratic topics, from 1961 to 1997, controlling for NYS Governor, NYC Mayor and NYT Publisher
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
all stories domestic stories non-local stories tristate stories NYC stories
Incumbent President is a Democrat 1.128** 1.115* 1.058 1.399* 1.37 1.086 1.128**
[2.05] [1.74] [0.79] [1.85] [1.57] [0.37] [1.98]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.326*** 1.269** 1.201* 0.934 3.360*** 2.195* 1.290***
[3.18] [2.53] [1.73] [0.19] [4.24] [1.93] [2.86]
0.765 0.735** 0.864 0.541 0.412** 0.446 0.787
[1.56] [2.09] [0.71] [1.16] [2.00] [1.11] [1.49]
1.03 1.038 0.976 1.038 1.488 0.616 1.069
[0.30] [0.37] [0.21] [0.12] [1.30] [1.07] [0.69]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Democrat 1.237** 1.225* 1.085 1.995*** 1.296 2.885** 1.177
[2.04] [1.89] [0.70] [2.67] [0.75] [2.33] [1.57]
0.816*** 0.833** 0.893 0.526*** 0.653* 0.749 0.815***
[2.87] [2.54] [1.45] [2.92] [1.73] [1.04] [2.81]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.457*** 1.593*** 1.455** 0.747 2.919* 2.149* 1.409**
[2.85] [3.69] [2.46] [0.59] [1.83] [1.68] [2.41]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.574** 1.784*** 1.723*** 0.697 1.726 2.181 1.525**
[2.53] [3.32] [2.63] [0.54] [0.75] [1.19] [2.30]
0.93 0.59 0.85 0.1 0.45 0.98 0.91
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.16
front page stories stories not on the 
front page
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Democratic topics (Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare), for different categories of news. For each
explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5%
(10%) significance.
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent 
President is a Democrat
relative frequency of Executive Orders
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Democrat
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign 
when the incumbent President is a Democrat
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Table 12: count of stories on Defense, from 1961 to 1997, controlling for NYS Governor, NYC Mayor and NYT publisher
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
all stories domestic stories
Incumbent President is a Republican 1.519*** 1.523*** 1.506*** 1.473* 1.492***
[5.08] [2.86] [4.40] [1.70] [4.62]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.610*** 2.147*** 1.432** 0.521 1.837***
[3.84] [3.06] [2.47] [1.15] [4.74]
0.483*** 0.390*** 0.602*** 1.007 0.450***
[5.25] [3.05] [2.64] [0.01] [5.47]
0.725 0.539* 0.883 1.204 0.700*
[1.60] [1.81] [0.49] [0.26] [1.78]
monthly Killed In Action (KIA), thousands 1.338*** 0.825 1.510*** 0.925 1.395***
[2.76] [1.05] [4.05] [0.34] [2.95]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Republican 0.724** 0.875 0.692*** 0.79 0.724**
[2.37] [0.60] [2.68] [0.63] [2.28]
1.209* 1.059 1.224** 1.478 1.175
[1.83] [0.34] [2.06] [1.56] [1.51]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.207 1.286 1.206 1.619 1.129
[1.12] [0.96] [0.96] [1.56] [0.66]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.125 1.617 1.052 0.462 1.175
[0.48] [1.25] [0.18] [1.03] [0.64]
0.06 0.43 0.37 0.06 0.16
0.43 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 444 444 444 444 444
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.11 0.25 0.2 0.22
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Defense, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR)
are reported, with robust z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%)
significance.
dummy for campaign years with issue ownership 
reversal ('64, '80, '96)
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Republican
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign 
when the incumbent President is a Republican
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign 
during ownership reversal campaigns
non-domestic 
stories
front page stories stories not on the 
front page
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent 
President is a Republican
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Table 13: count of stories on Law & Crime, from 1961 to 1997, controlling for NYS Governor, NYC Mayor and NYT publisher
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
all stories domestic stories non-local stories tristate stories NYC stories
Incumbent President is a Republican 1.073 1.071 1.210** 0.844 0.947 1.217 1.059
[1.16] [1.04] [2.17] [0.92] [0.34] [0.71] [0.90]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.034 1.082 1.079 1.461 0.71 2.065 0.981
[0.17] [0.39] [0.29] [0.86] [0.91] [1.17] [0.10]
1.097 0.987 1.025 1.206 1.016 1.117 1.091
[0.45] [0.06] [0.09] [0.46] [0.03] [0.18] [0.42]
0.954 1.003 0.837 1.438 1.074 0.301 1.031
[0.26] [0.01] [0.82] [0.98] [0.13] [1.12] [0.16]
1.096 1.226 1.183 1.426 0.947 1.462 1.074
[0.44] [0.98] [0.70] [0.62] [0.10] [0.48] [0.33]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Republican 0.830* 0.862 0.641*** 0.733 1.468* 1.045 0.821**
[1.93] [1.45] [3.15] [1.21] [1.92] [0.10] [2.06]
1.226*** 1.275*** 1.126 1.980*** 1.335* 1.195 1.216***
[2.76] [3.11] [1.30] [3.42] [1.70] [0.54] [2.66]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.384 1.298 1.738** 0.822 0.978 1.897 1.353
[1.61] [1.31] [2.54] [0.45] [0.05] [0.79] [1.50]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.562* 1.614** 2.152*** 0.581 0.87 4.188 1.46
[1.91] [1.99] [3.07] [0.94] [0.23] [1.40] [1.59]
0.38 0.62 0.63 0.06 0.29 0.04 0.65
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.14
relative frequency of Executive Orders
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Republican
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign when 
the incumbent President is a Republican
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Law & Crime, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with robust z
statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.
front page stories stories not on the 
front page
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent President 
is a Republican
dummy for campaign years with issue ownership reversal 
('76, '92, '96)
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Table 14: Poisson estimates on the collapsed dataset, entire sample and post-1960 subsample
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Incumbent President dummy 1.180** 1.045 0.968 1.316* 1.538*** 0.882
[2.09] [0.39] [0.42] [1.79] [4.12] [0.86]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.221*** 0.829 0.979 1.252** 1.305 0.926
[2.76] [1.36] [0.13] [2.52] [1.17] [0.37]
0.817 1.043 1.297 0.766 0.574*** 1.342
[1.46] [0.23] [1.16] [1.38] [2.68] [1.26]
- 1.451* 0.931 - 0.984 0.982
[1.94] [0.44] [0.05] [0.10]
- 1.919*** - - 1.46 -
[4.05] [1.22]
1.036 2.441** 29.055 1.038 2.727* 28.525
[0.16] [2.04] [1.19] [0.18] [1.95] [1.13]
0.98 0.42 0.09 0.82 0.15 0.13
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes
Total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 27 27 27 18 18 18
Pseudo R2 0.1 0.28 0.16 0.12 0.36 0.13
Notes: Poisson regressions of the total number of stories about Democratic topics, Defense and Law & Crime. For Democratic stories (columns [1] and [3]) the incumbent President dummy equals one when the
incumbent President is a Democrat. Vice versa for Defense and Law & Crime (columns [2], [3], [5] and [6]). The interaction term is defined accordingly. Campaign years with issue ownership reversal are 1964,
1980 and 1996 for Defense and 1976, 1992 and 1996 for Law & Crime. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with robust z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient
is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.
Democratic stories Democratic stories
number of Killed In action (KIA), thousands
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent President 
dummy
dummy for campaign years with issue ownership reversal
relative frequency of Executive Orders
p value for no effects of the campaign when the incumbent 
owns the issue
entire sample post-1960 subsample
Defense stories Law & Crime stories Defense stories Law & Crime stories
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year gallup number question no start date end date topic exact wording
Democrats Republicans difference yearly average diff.
1948 412T qn3_2 06/02/1948 11/02/1948 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union and other countries 34.15 33.14 1.01 - 1584
1948 420 qn15b_K 16/06/1948 16/06/1948 foreign policy deal with world affairs 34.50 36.67 -2.17 -0.58 1606
1952 496 qn10b 23/07/1952 23/07/1952 defense/foreign policy keep country at peace 31.62 34.53 -2.91 - 2992
1952 506 qn18d 07/10/1952 07/10/1952 defense (Korea) handle Korean situation 18.58 65.37 -46.79 -24.85 3078
1960 627 qn53e 26/04/1960 26/04/1960 defense/foreign policy keep US out of World War III 27.10 38.87 -11.77 - 2727
1960 627 qn53a 26/04/1960 26/04/1960 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union's leaders 29.77 50.48 -20.71 -16.24 2728
1964 697 qn5b 04/08/1964 04/08/1964 defense (Vietnam) handle situation getting worse in Vietnam 61.03 18.71 42.32 - 3197
1964 696 qn7d 04/08/1964 04/08/1964 defense (Vietnam) handle situation getting worse in Vietnam 56.36 14.77 41.59 41.96 3020
1968 763 qn11 13/06/1968 18/06/1968 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam war 41.35 41.13 0.22 - 3197
1968 766 qn13 07/08/1968 12/08/1968 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam war 26.97 54.06 -27.09 - 3152
1968 767 qn18a 30/08/1968 30/08/1968 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam war 27.89 47.20 -19.31 - 3148
1968 768 qn8 19/09/1968 24/09/1968 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam war 25.86 44.78 -18.92 - 3182
1968 770 qn14 17/10/1968 22/10/1968 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam war 30.14 45.37 -15.23 - 3251
1968 637 qn63e 18/10/1968 23/10/1968 defense/foreign policy keep US out of World War III 27.14 40.80 -13.66 - 2988
1968 637 qn63a 18/10/1968 23/10/1968 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union's leaders 38.55 43.24 -4.69 -14.10 2988
1972 858 qn11 19/09/1972 19/09/1972 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam situation 25.90 58.29 -32.39 - 3263
1972 859 qn9 10/10/1972 10/10/1972 defense/foreign policy keep US out of World War III 26.15 35.66 -9.51 -20.95 2914
1976 959 qn15l 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 defense handle national defense 29.00 43.95 -14.95 - 2662
1976 959 qn15d 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 defense/foreign policy keep US out of war 27.69 41.62 -13.93 - 2662
1976 959 qn15a 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 foreign policy handle relations with other nations 24.94 50.86 -25.92 - 2662
1976 959 qn15g 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union 22.31 47.11 -24.80 - 2662
1976 960 qn9d 05/10/1976 05/10/1976 defense handle national defense 40.95 38.90 2.05 - 2725
1976 960 qn9b 05/10/1976 05/10/1976 defense/foreign policy keep US out of war 33.25 45.36 -12.11 - 2725
1976 960 qn9a 05/10/1976 05/10/1976 foreign policy handle relations with other nations 34.24 46.75 -12.51 -14.60 2725
1980 GP 156G qn4e 27/05/1980 27/05/1980 defense/foreign policy keep US out of war 46.60 20.14 26.46 - 2820
1980 GP 156G qn4g 27/05/1980 27/05/1980 foreign policy (Iran) handle the Iranian situation 34.04 28.44 5.60 - 2820
1980 GP 156G qn4f 27/05/1980 27/05/1980 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union 35.11 30.00 5.11 - 2820
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gD 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 defense/foreign policy keep US out of war 49.73 24.58 25.15 - 2819
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gK 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 environment deal with environmental problem 37.96 29.05 8.91 - 2819
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gA 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 foreign policy handle foreign relations 43.53 34.69 8.84 - 2819
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gS 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 foreign policy increase respect for US overseas 31.82 41.22 -9.40 - 2819
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gG 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 foreign policy (Iran) handle the Iranian situation 33.20 37.99 -4.79 - 2819
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gR 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 foreign policy (Israel) deal with Arab-Israeli situation 46.54 28.88 17.66 - 2819
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gE 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union 40.16 35.62 4.54 8.81 2819
1984 GP 240G qn7b 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 defense/foreign policy keep country out of war 46.64 35.54 11.10 - 2720
1984 GP 240G qn7e 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 foreign policy handle foreign relations 33.29 49.52 -16.23 - 2720
1984 GP 240G qn7o 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 foreign policy increase respect for US overseas 33.44 48.13 -14.69 - 2720
1984 GP 240G qn7k 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 foreign policy (Central America) deal with situation in Central America 34.35 41.30 -6.95 - 2720
1984 GP 240G qn7f 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union 33.97 48.40 -14.43 -8.24 2720
1988 Ad hoc telephone survey 2 qn3b 13/05/1988 15/05/1988 defense/foreign policy keep country out of war 40.57 36.60 3.97 - 1640
1988 Ad hoc telephone survey 2 qn3c 13/05/1988 15/05/1988 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union 29.35 48.49 -19.14 - 1640
1988 Democratic Convention qn11a 21/07/1988 22/07/1988 defense/foreign policy keep country out of war 49.57 32.09 17.48 - 5792
1988 Democratic Convention qn11e 21/07/1988 22/07/1988 foreign policy (Soviet Union) manage relations with Soviet Union and other foreign countries 34.05 49.93 -15.88 - 5792
1988 Republican Convention qn8a 18/08/1988 19/08/1988 defense/foreign policy keep country out of war 34.48 49.73 -15.25 -5.76 1382
1992 January In-Depth Survey qn20d 03/01/1992 06/01/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 27.90 56.79 -28.89 - 4852
1992 March Campaign Benchmark qn20l 20/03/1992 22/03/1992 defense handle national defense 20.64 71.49 -50.85 - 1543
1992 March Campaign Benchmark qn20d 20/03/1992 22/03/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 21.77 69.66 -47.89 - 1543
1992 Pre-Democratic Convention Poll qn10e 06/07/1992 08/07/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 14.06 62.60 -48.54 - 1554
1992 Pre-Democratic Convention qn7b 09/07/1992 10/07/1992 foreign policy handle foreign policy 16.20 60.71 -44.51 - 1158
1992 Post-Democratic Convention Poll qn9d 17/07/1992 18/07/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 24.79 64.03 -39.24 - 1170
1992 Pre Republican Convention Poll qn12a 10/08/1992 12/08/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 30.20 61.55 -31.35 - 1531
1992 Post GOP Convention qn4b 21/08/1992 21/08/1992 foreign policy handle foreign policy 23.99 69.79 -45.80 - 698
1992 Post-Republican Convention Poll qn11a 21/08/1992 23/08/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 19.33 72.57 -53.24 - 1191
1992 Labor Day Benchmark qn14a 31/08/1992 02/09/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 24.43 66.93 -42.50 - 1573
1992 Fall In-Depth Benchmark qn20a 11/09/1992 15/09/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 20.10 72.97 -52.87 - 1808
1992 Campaign Issues qn5g 11/10/1992 11/10/1992 foreign policy handle foreign policy 21.37 64.38 -43.01 - 424
1992 Pres Election October Benchmark qn14b 23/10/1992 25/10/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 18.08 65.53 -47.45 -44.32 1602
1996 July Wave 1 qn9k 18/07/1996 21/07/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 44.93 38.73 6.20 - 1010
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 5 qn34b 30/09/1996 06/10/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 47.75 39.47 8.28 - 3255
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 6 qn34b 07/10/1996 13/10/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 48.52 39.44 9.08 - 3805
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 7 qn34b 14/10/1996 20/10/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 49.10 38.29 10.81 - 3686
1996 October Pre-Election Roundup qn11h 25/10/1996 27/10/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 47.56 41.69 5.87 - 461
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 8 qn34b 21/10/1996 27/10/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 48.73 38.13 10.60 - 3763
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 9 qn34b 28/10/1996 03/11/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 49.19 37.82 11.37 - 4939
1996 General Election Tracking Poll OJ Study qn34b 21/10/1996 03/11/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 43.86 40.86 3.00 8.15 567
Problem is better handled by no of 
respondents
Table A.1: detailed list of Gallup polls on issue ownership. Defense and foreign policy.
47
year gallup number question no start date end date topic exact wording
Democrats Republicans difference yearly average diff.
1956 564 qn15 08/05/1956 08/05/1956 civil rights handle segregation (relation between whites and Negroes) 28.41 25.99 2.42 2.42 1901
1960 627 qn53f 26/04/1960 26/04/1960 civil rights handle racial integration in schools 33.84 30.38 3.46 3.46 2722
1964 696 qn12 04/08/1964 04/08/1964 civil rights handle relations between the whites and the Negroes 49.33 17.51 31.82 - 3513
1964 696 qn97 04/08/1964 04/08/1964 civil rights handle situation between whites and Negroes getting worse 57.22 19.16 38.06 34.94 3513
1968 637 qn63f 18/10/1968 23/10/1968 civil rights handle racial integration in schools 35.04 23.93 11.11 11.11 2988
1976 959 qn15r 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 civil rights guarantee civil rights 42.37 25.39 16.98 16.98 2662
1980 GP 156G qn4h 27/05/1980 27/05/1980 civil rights deal with racial problems 41.13 19.50 21.63 - 2820
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gH 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 civil rights deal with racial problems 46.93 25.01 21.92 - 2819
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gQ 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 civil rights improve things for minorities (incl. blacks and Hispanics) 48.32 21.21 27.11 23.55 2819
1984 GP 240G qn7d 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 civil rights improve things for minorities (incl. blacks and Hispanics) 54.38 24.57 29.81 29.81 2720
1988 Ad hoc telephone survey 2 qn3h 13/05/1988 15/05/1988 civil rights protect the civil rights of minority groups 49.04 25.78 23.26 23.26 1640
1992 January In-Depth Survey qn20g 03/01/1992 06/01/1992 civil rights handle race relations 50.76 30.44 20.32 - 4852
1992 March Campaign Benchmark qn20g 20/03/1992 22/03/1992 civil rights handle race relations 40.32 41.73 -1.41 - 1543
1992 May Wave 1 qn21 07/05/1992 10/05/1992 civil rights improve conditions for minorities in urban areas 35.74 21.40 14.34 - 4007
1992 Pre-Democratic Convention qn7d 09/07/1992 10/07/1992 civil rights handle race relations 38.89 23.63 15.26 - 1158
1992 Post-Democratic Convention Poll qn9g 17/07/1992 18/07/1992 civil rights handle race relations 57.57 22.27 35.30 16.76 1170
1996 July Wave 1 qn9j 18/07/1996 21/07/1996 civil rights handle gay marriages 41.33 26.87 14.46 14.46 1010
1976 959 qn15m 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 welfare state deal with welfare situation 51.88 25.54 26.34 - 2662
1976 959 qn15p 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 welfare state provide for the poor and the elderly 57.48 23.59 33.89 30.12 2662
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gO 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 welfare state help the poor and needy 48.00 22.92 25.08 25.08 2819
1984 GP 240G qn7l 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 welfare state help the poor and needy 59.61 24.94 34.67 34.67 2720
1988 Ad hoc telephone survey 2 qn3f 13/05/1988 15/05/1988 welfare state help the poor and needy 53.81 24.41 29.40 29.40 1640
1992 January In-Depth Survey qn20h 03/01/1992 06/01/1992 welfare state handle poverty and homelessness 62.16 23.98 38.18 - 4852
1992 March Campaign Benchmark qn20h 20/03/1992 22/03/1992 welfare state handle poverty and homelessness 58.07 25.65 32.42 35.30 1543
1996 April Wave 1 qn17e 09/04/1996 10/04/1996 handle welfare  welfare state 50.32 37.42 12.90 - 1010
1996 July Wave 1 qn9b 18/07/1996 21/07/1996 handle welfare policy welfare state 48.55 30.94 17.61 - 1010
1996 October Pre-Election Roundup qn11b 25/10/1996 27/10/1996 handle welfare policy welfare state 56.05 36.60 19.45 16.65 461
1992 January In-Depth Survey qn20c 03/01/1992 06/01/1992 health care handle health care policy 59.39 27.06 32.33 - 4852
1992 March Campaign Benchmark qn20c 20/03/1992 22/03/1992 health care handle health care policy 54.23 31.26 22.97 - 1543
1992 Pre-Democratic Convention Poll qn10b 06/07/1992 08/07/1992 health care handle health care policy 33.38 23.30 10.08 - 1554
1992 Post-Democratic Convention Poll qn9c 17/07/1992 18/07/1992 health care handle health care policy 61.94 20.30 41.64 - 1170
1992 Post GOP Convention qn4g 21/08/1992 21/08/1992 health care handle health care 58.08 32.12 25.96 - 698
1992 Post-Republican Convention Poll qn11e 21/08/1992 23/08/1992 health care handle health care policy 54.29 32.54 21.75 - 1191
1992 Labor Day Benchmark qn14e 31/08/1992 02/09/1992 health care handle health care policy 61.70 26.76 34.94 - 1573
1992 Campaign Issues qn5h 11/10/1992 11/10/1992 health care handle health care 58.05 22.84 35.21 - 424
1992 Pres Election October Benchmark qn14f 23/10/1992 25/10/1992 health care handle health care 49.56 23.55 26.01 27.88 1602
1996 April Wave 1 qn17d 09/04/1996 10/04/1996 health care handle health care 55.68 33.76 21.92 - 1010
1996 July Wave 1 qn9e 18/07/1996 21/07/1996 health care handle Medicare 49.18 30.07 19.11 - 1010
1996 1996 Election qn12c 05/08/1996 07/08/1996 health care handle Medicare 48.86 30.33 18.53 - 986
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 5 qn34h 30/09/1996 06/10/1996 health care handle Medicare 49.97 29.07 20.90 - 1601
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 6 qn34h 07/10/1996 13/10/1996 health care handle Medicare 51.11 30.03 21.08 - 3805
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 7 qn34h 14/10/1996 20/10/1996 health care handle Medicare 50.37 30.26 20.11 - 3686
1996 October Pre-Election Roundup qn11c 25/10/1996 27/10/1996 health care handle health care policy 60.50 33.62 26.88 - 461
1996 October Pre-Election Roundup qn11e 25/10/1996 27/10/1996 health care handle Medicare 56.69 36.27 20.42 21.12 461
1972 858 qn12 19/09/1972 19/09/1972 crime  better job of dealing with crime and lawlessness 26.23 50.05 -23.82 -23.82 3263
1988 Republican Convention qn8d 18/08/1988 19/08/1988 crime fight crime 33.97 43.27 -9.30 -9.30 1382
1992 Pre-Democratic Convention qn7c 09/07/1992 10/07/1992 crime handle crime 24.80 24.43 0.37 - 1158
1992 Pre Republican Convention Poll qn12e 10/08/1992 12/08/1992 crime handle crime and drugs 51.15 34.66 16.49 - 1531
1992 Post GOP Convention qn4c 21/08/1992 21/08/1992 crime handle crime 41.30 40.89 0.41 - 698
1992 Fall Tracking Poll  qn11b 09/10/1992 11/10/1992 crime handle crime 39.07 33.56 5.51 - 1567
1992 Campaign Issues qn5e 11/10/1992 11/10/1992 crime handle crime 34.04 35.88 -1.84 - 424
1992 Pres Election October Benchmark qn14g 23/10/1992 25/10/1992 crime handle crime 31.88 29.20 2.68 3.94 1602
1996 July Wave 1 qn9g 35264 35267 crime handle crime 43.91 34.68 9.23 - 1010
1996 1996 Election qn12e 35282 35284 crime handle crime 43.6 33.44 10.16 - 986
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 4 qn31 35331 35337 crime handle drug abuse 44.66 37.69 6.97 - 1109
1996 October Pre-Election Roundup qn11g 35363 35365 crime handle crime 53.9 37.71 16.19 - 461
1996 General Election Tracking Poll OJ Study qn31 35359 35372 crime handle drug abuse 44.3 37.89 6.41 9.79 1129
Problem is better handled by no of 
respondents
Table A.2: detailed list of Gallup polls on issue ownership. Civil rights, welfare state, health care and crime.
48
year
% MIP % Dem. Adv. % MIP % Dem. Adv. % MIP % Dem. Adv. % MIP % Dem. Adv.
1972 6.54 10.94 10.76 27.36 19.62 -11.40 33.90 -10.09 994
1976 0.80 14.29 34.85 43.49 8.15 9.15 5.11 -6.74 1742
1980 0.07 -100 14.83 -4.06 1.48 -15.00 32.10 -28.21 1349
1984 0.39 85.71 23.31 11.89 4.04 -38.89 33.48 -7.78 1780
1988 0.84 42.86 21.97 25.82 20.82 -3.21 9.72 -15.72 1657
1992 1.26 41.67 37.09 42.07 11.86 -19.11 3.15 11.86 1906
1996 2.96 45.45 37.58 25.27 28.57 -13.08 4.38 3.45 777
Notes: data being used in table 1 are highlighted.
Table A.3: National Election Study data on Most Important Problem and Issue Ownership, 1972-1996
no of 
respondents
racial problems [8] social welfare [9] public order [7] defense & foreign affairs [3]
49
